weasel1962 wrote:With due respect, that's not how a FARP works. What is critical is that FARPs are the key feature of distributed operations. Its to avoid permanent bases that can be targeted. Downplaying FARPs for the USAF is basically saying distributed ops don't work in their context. FARPs, including fighter FARPs are thus not meant to be permanent bases. They are meant to be temporary runways for use from hours to days max.
I know what a temporary FARP is and what it is meant to do.
weasel1962 wrote: As forward points, they are closer to the target i.e. no air tankers required. The set-up of a FARP may require transports but these are transient. They land, offload and take off. Not parked at the base. Otherwise, no permanent basing of support aircraft either...
Maybe I wasn't clear enough. The RAND document you've linked says this:
" ... Since the concepts for distributed air operations are still emerging [published in 2019], this report is necessarily exploratory and conceptual. We synthesize and expand on existing concepts for distributed operations in order to identify possible capabilities for distributed operations as a starting point for identifying implications for force presentation. We focus in this study on presenting forward deployed fighter forces. ..." (page 20)
In other words, there's no right or wrong way to do this laid out in technical formality, it's a developing concept of operating and what makes the best practical, tactical and achievable sense is what will be done, to enable the most effective survivable FARPing with the available geography. Adaptation to what works will be the rule, and nothing will be unchanging in a fight.
So firstly, your initial linked document from 2013 cites using a
C-17A as the refueling source for a flight of 4 x F-22A on the ground,
so tanking is involved in FARPing, the only question is where and when does it take place? And that ground refuel consumes more time on the ground. Which as I think you said earlier can be as long as 60 minutes. The reaction and flight time of a BM to a FARP is shorter than that, so the main benefit of FARPing is lost if it takes approximately 1 hour to get everything back into the air due to fueling jets on the ground.
Tanking is involved in getting to the FARP Island (at least one refuel). It is involved again on the return to a base, from the FARP strikes. The 2013 document cites F-22A, with JDAM bombs - not with JSM or JASSM-ER standoff margins added. So Raptors must fly to the Chinese mainland and perhaps over it for a distance before it drops JDAMs. Meaning it would need close coordination with an escorted tanker waiting for it on the way out. Look at the distance involved. You can't do this without considerable tanking support.
To thus shorten the time on the ground, and exposure to BM strikes you could just refuel the four F-35s after they takeoff from the FARP strip, prior to the strike leg, via using a tanker. The tanker has 2 F-35A escorts protecting it, and also detecting any threats to the FARP, while aircraft are on the ground, and providing real time warning data to the ground.
That makes FARPing much more viable as only 4 x F-35 need hot-reload of weapons on the ground and no fuel. But you would not fly all the way to a FARP and perform just one strike. The key benefit of FARPing is to be closer to the action, to enable more strikes per day, not just one of them. FARPs are not usually operated from the very beginning of a conflict. But in this case it would be hoped they can begin early and continue through out the conflict.
But you'd want to get in at least two strikes per FARP mission before the fighters head back to a base further to the west, say to Guam, or perhaps as far as Wake Island. While most of the tankers must head further eastward to Midway or Hickam to survive on the ground.
This is how I see it occurring: 6 x F-35A takeoff from Guam and head west towards China, 4 of them carry long-range strike weapons, two of them carry A2A weapons (escorts). They meet up with a tanker between Guam and China and tank. The two A2A F-35A stay with the tanker and protect it, the 4 x F-35A with strike weapons attack Chinese targets with Cruise weapons,
then return to a FARP Island for a reload. Meanwhile the tanker and its escorts move towards this FARP Island, just as the 4 x F-35A have reloaded with strike weapons and are now ready to launch from the FARP runway. They launch and meet up with the Tanker and escorts near to the FARP Island and refuel, then again attack Chinese targets. The two escorts stay with the tanker and refuel off it as needed. Once the 4 strike F-35A return eastwards, they meet up with the escorted tanker and top-off their tanks, and all 6 x F-35A return to Guam, then the Tanker continues on to Midway, to a more survivable parking area. It's easier for the F-35As to operate and park survivably on Guam (off base). Else they can refuel in Guam, and head for Wake Island before staging from there for the next double-strike FARP attack.
i.e. one FARP double-strike attack every two days (the reason is made clear below).
The closer a FARP Island is to the Chinese mainland the shorter Chinese weapon flight times, and the more important it is to refuel the jets in the air, after reload and launching off the FARP Island, refueling from the escorted tanker.
If you do that you don't need a C-17A involved on the ground to operate a FARP, as the weapons for the second strike's hot-reload can be delivered by over-flight and GPS/INS-guided parachute drop, days in advance of the attack.
This sort of double-strike with a FARP reload in between, would be a fairly standard way to do it (perhaps a triple strike is possible) and may require two tankers to deliver at least two full loads of fuel plus a contingency margin to 6 x F-35A.
weasel1962 wrote:I can understand the resistance expressed from the USAF support communities. Do so much work to set up something that's gone in a few hours or days. Is that really efficient or effective use of resources? I think the appeal to the USMC who have expeditionary ingrained cultural thinking and resources are a bit different.
And with equal respect I don't think you're taking the point on board. Are tankers going to come from San Francisco each mission? Of course not. They will be mostly located on Hawaii and West of Hawaii. And not only tankers. I mentioned several larger aircraft types but presume I refer to every large aircraft type used in the theater. They must be parked somewhere and it will be as close as survivably possible to the battle zone.
Can you imagine flying a fighter or a heavy half way across the Pacific, into battle and back each day? It's not possible without constantly rotating in fresh crews. For example; it's 9,700 nm from Hickam to Kadena and return. At 450 knots (ignoring winds) that's 20.8 hours flying to support each FARP double-strike, not including the time for the strikes, plus the time on the ground, before and after the flight.
So each FARP-supporting refuel flight is at least 24 hours of aircrew duty, i.e. you need 2 crews on each FARP tanker to do it, then crew recovery time after the mission. The FARPs predictably must happen at night
and with these constraints it implies 1 tanker can probably support one half of a 6-ship FARP attack, only once every two days, if operating from Hickam or Midway for survivability reasons.And frankly, the
heavy loaded FARP tanker must also receive AAR support to the FARP. So this requires at least two tankers per 6-ship FARP double-strike. And that's without contingency needs. So it will probably require at least 3 tankers to launch a 6-ship FARP strike, if large aircraft (i.e. of all types) have to park at Hickam just to survive the first weeks of the fight.
And yes, there are more Islands with >6,000 ft runways in the mid-western Pacific region but these are still very sparse, and parking is still going to be heavily concentrated at those.
So given those numbers the support aircraft are going to be parked closer to the action, i.e. mostly west of Hawaii and closer to PLAAF bomber weapons and PLA BM artillery. As will be everything else that needs to be close to the fight. To get the effects sooner a higher risk of losses must be taken, Distributed Operations paradigm, or not.
The potential will exist for significant support aircraft losses on the ground.Thus bombers become the platform of choice to pour in strikes when fighters are being held back for a time by the anti-access/area denial implications. Once PLAAF bombers and tankers are dealt with the situation relaxes, and parked aircraft less vulnerable, if Patriot and Aegis can deal with the BMs and hyperbole-weapons.
Thus using a logistics type, as a supplemental 'bomber' (ramp-shooter), to speed up taking out PLAAF bombers and C4 sooner, means support aircraft and FARPs can operate much more efficiently thereafter.
07 Nov 2019, 07:19
