Sinking 300 Chinese ships in 72 hours?!

[jessmo112]

More specifically, last October Flournoy said one of the issues the Pentagon needs to weigh going forward is “what capabilities would US naval and air forces need to credibly threaten to sink 300 military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships within 72 hours? Such a capability would certainly pose a fundamental dilemma for any great power contemplating aggression.”

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/dep ... -vs-china/

Im assuming that the Majority of the sinking will be done nt allied air power.
If this is the plan versus China:
A. its extremely ambitious.
B. We could see in the future the mother of all naval battles!
C. Losing 300 ships could force the Chinese into using tactical weapons. The loss of life alone would be catastrophic!
D. This shows that we are leaning heavily towards mass efficiency, with 1 bomb 1 missile kill 1 ship opposed to mass swarms of cruise missiles..you cant kill that many ships with mass attacks.

[gc]

Just some very very arbitrary calculations with the assumption that there is adequate procurement and production existing or near term anti-ship munitions in the next few years, and that there is a robust C4ISR architecture present (JADC2). Seems plausible.

B-1B bomber fleet
Launching 8 maritime strike sorties every 24 hours for 72 hours with the remainder utilized to conduct strikes on land targets. Each maritime strike B-1B loaded with 24 LRASMs. 6 LRASMs allocated per target to ensure defense penetration: (8 x 3 x 24) / 6 = 96 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill).

USN CG/DDG fleet
50 allocated to PACFLEET currently, assuming 50% (25) surged forward due to rising hostilities. Each striking 3 enemy major surface combatants with multiple Maritime Strike Tomahawks and SM-6s in the 72 hour period. Remainder VLS tubes utilized for area air defense, land attack Tomahawks and Vertical Launched ASROCs: 25 x 3 = 75 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill).

SSN fleet: 30 assigned to PACLEET currently, assuming 50% (15) surged forward due to rising hostilities. Each striking 3 enemy major surface combatants with MK-48 ADCAP torpedoes, Harpoons or Maritime Strike Tomahawks within the 72 hour period. 15 x 3 = 45 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill).

Carrier-based aviation:
3 CAW present at commencement of hostilities, surging at 150 sorties per carrier per 24 hours. 20% of sorties are maritime strike sorties. Each maritime strike sortie aircraft loaded with two LRASMs or Harpoons or SLAM-ERs or JSOW-C1. 6 missiles per target to ensure defense penetration. (0.2 x 150 x 3 x 2) / 6 = 30 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill).

96 + 75 + 45 + 30 = 246 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill)
Lower end PLAN combatants, which makes up majority of their fleet, are significantly easier to kill and will not need six missiles per target to ensure a hit.

Other weapons available:
- LCS with 8 x NSM
- HIMARs with Cross-domain ATACMs
- USMC land-based Hornets with 2x Harpoons/SLAM-ERs/JSOWs
- USN P-8A Poseidons with 4 x Harpoons

As you can see, LRASMs, Maritime Strike Tomahawks and SM-6s are crucial and current production rates are lacking.
Number of ships that can be struck in 72 hours will improve further as US Army acquires their anti-ship PrSMs and land-based launchers for MSTs and SM-6s.
The entire JADC2 architecture needs to be beefed up significantly.

[madrat]

Probably wise to account for taking out the 300,000 boats of the South China Sea within that 72 hours, too.

You cannot afford to leave the sea lane open to any traffic.

[wrightwing]

Just some very very arbitrary calculations with the assumption that there is adequate procurement and production existing or near term anti-ship munitions in the next few years, and that there is a robust C4ISR architecture present (JADC2). Seems plausible.

B-1B bomber fleet
Launching 8 maritime strike sorties every 24 hours for 72 hours with the remainder utilized to conduct strikes on land targets. Each maritime strike B-1B loaded with 24 LRASMs. 6 LRASMs allocated per target to ensure defense penetration: (8 x 3 x 24) / 6 = 96 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill).

USN CG/DDG fleet
50 allocated to PACFLEET currently, assuming 50% (25) surged forward due to rising hostilities. Each striking 3 enemy major surface combatants with multiple Maritime Strike Tomahawks and SM-6s in the 72 hour period. Remainder VLS tubes utilized for area air defense, land attack Tomahawks and Vertical Launched ASROCs: 25 x 3 = 75 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill).

SSN fleet: 30 assigned to PACLEET currently, assuming 50% (15) surged forward due to rising hostilities. Each striking 3 enemy major surface combatants with MK-48 ADCAP torpedoes, Harpoons or Maritime Strike Tomahawks within the 72 hour period. 15 x 3 = 45 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill).

Carrier-based aviation:
3 CAW present at commencement of hostilities, surging at 150 sorties per carrier per 24 hours. 20% of sorties are maritime strike sorties. Each maritime strike sortie aircraft loaded with two LRASMs or Harpoons or SLAM-ERs or JSOW-C1. 6 missiles per target to ensure defense penetration. (0.2 x 150 x 3 x 2) / 6 = 30 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill).

96 + 75 + 45 + 30 = 246 enemy major surface combatants hit (mission kill)
Lower end PLAN combatants, which makes up majority of their fleet, are significantly easier to kill and will not need six missiles per target to ensure a hit.

Other weapons available:
- LCS with 8 x NSM
- HIMARs with Cross-domain ATACMs
- USMC land-based Hornets with 2x Harpoons/SLAM-ERs/JSOWs
- USN P-8A Poseidons with 4 x Harpoons

As you can see, LRASMs, Maritime Strike Tomahawks and SM-6s are crucial and current production rates are lacking.
Number of ships that can be struck in 72 hours will improve further as US Army acquires their anti-ship PrSMs and land-based launchers for MSTs and SM-6s.
The entire JADC2 architecture needs to be beefed up significantly.

If you add in some B-2s and B-52s which can carry 16 and 20 LRASMs respectively, as well as Harpoons in the B-52s case, that increases the number of surface combatants, that can be hit.

[marauder2048]

Per the SAR and the FY2021 budget, they are adding a weapons data link to JASSM*
(presumably XR but also possibly ER) so the LRASM inventory could be saved for those surface ships
that are imprecisely located and have to be tracked by emissions.

* which was the original proposal for JASSM Maritime Interdiction

[jessmo112]

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnav ... 10327.aspx

Another article recently mentions the failures and setbacks the chinese are having developing a blue water carrier force. China has also now militarized fishing boats. Do we still use the old wind corrected munitions dispensers? Once we have the air does fleet size even matter?

[spazsinbad]

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20210327.aspx Another article recently mentions the failures and setbacks the chinese are having developing a blue water carrier force....

As one reads this article the not correct VTOL is mentioned but allowed I guess then one encounters this: "...The F-35B usually takes off via a catapult or ski jump since it can get into the air with more fuel and weapons that way. Landing is usually done vertically because it is safer. F-35Bs are used on U.S. LHDs but most take off and land in VTOL mode...." Then one begins to wonder what else the author does not understand, putting this 'navav article' in question at least.

[inst]

https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20210327.aspx

Another article recently mentions the failures and setbacks the chinese are having developing a blue water carrier force. China has also now militarized fishing boats. Do we still use the old wind corrected munitions dispensers? Once we have the air does fleet size even matter?

Strategypage is known to be low reliability and works mainly be appealing to its readers prejudices.

Chinese carrier aviation, likewise, is less interesting as a decisive maritime force (on the offensive, ocean warfare is winner take all) and more for force projection against non-aligns and to absorb fire while land-based assets (IRBMs, cruise missiles, and aircraft) do the work.

The Type 055s are more interesting in the PLAN, as they're roughly equivalent to the latest Arleigh Burkes (GaN radar on both of them, larger radar aperture on the Type 055s, the Type 055s are intended for IEP, designed to be upgraded to laser / railgun warfare, have a larger VLS capacity than the Arleigh Burkes).

What the Chinese do wrong, however, is that they don't have any equivalent to American ESSM systems, so the Type 055s (to date) are vulnerable to saturation missile attacks by even subsonic missiles.

===

We're approaching the age, anyways, where carriers are no longer primary surface combatants. They'll always have a use as a way to launch AEW&C craft, or to provide replenishment support for ground forces, or to provide sustained bombardment against surface forces, but given Chinese advances in anti-carrier warfare, as well as likely American advances in anti-carrier warfare, destroyers, cruisers, and so on, are going to be more decisive, simply because missiles launched from VLS, or future laser systems, can shoot down attacking missiles or perhaps even torpedoes. Strikes from carrier aviation are just going to be too limited in alpha-strike capability to bypass naval missile defense capability in the future.

[weasel1962]

What the Chinese do wrong, however, is that they don't have any equivalent to American ESSM systems, so the Type 055s (to date) are vulnerable to saturation missile attacks by even subsonic missiles.

HQ-10 + CIWS is standard fit for most vessels incl 055. Like US, they train against missile attacks using drones (incl simulated saturation). Example:
https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/decodin ... exercises/

The disclaimer is always effectiveness is not tested in actual combat.

[XanderCrews]

More specifically, last October Flournoy said one of the issues the Pentagon needs to weigh going forward is “what capabilities would US naval and air forces need to credibly threaten to sink 300 military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships within 72 hours? Such a capability would certainly pose a fundamental dilemma for any great power contemplating aggression.”

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11/dep ... -vs-china/

If this is the plan versus China:
A. its extremely ambitious.
B. We could see in the future the mother of all naval battles!

I'm late to the party, but I don't read this the way you do. Threaten to sink. In other words he's asking what happens when we go from fighting a force of 0 ships to 300 overnight? How can we fight and win?

its nothing really new, he just wants a plan and mindset moving that way. Shift away from GWOT.

C. Losing 300 ships could force the Chinese into using tactical weapons. The loss of life alone would be catastrophic!

I assume you mean nukes?

D. This shows that we are leaning heavily towards mass efficiency, with 1 bomb 1 missile kill 1 ship opposed to mass swarms of cruise missiles..you cant kill that many ships with mass attacks.

LOL sure why not.

Im assuming that the Majority of the sinking will be done nt allied air power.

No

[inst]

What the Chinese do wrong, however, is that they don't have any equivalent to American ESSM systems, so the Type 055s (to date) are vulnerable to saturation missile attacks by even subsonic missiles.

HQ-10 + CIWS is standard fit for most vessels incl 055. Like US, they train against missile attacks using drones (incl simulated saturation). Example:
https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/decodin ... exercises/

The disclaimer is always effectiveness is not tested in actual combat.

ESSM is quadpacked. HHQ-10 is a short-ranged system meant for point defense, whereas ESSM can have destroyers provide area missile defense coverage. There's been rumors that they'd quadpack DK-10, but no evidence for such has been shown.

Another issue is Chinese interest in EMALS VLS, which could potentially increase capability for short-ranged missile defense, but is likely going to be bulky and less suited for ESSM equivalent work. It's very impressive that the Arleigh Burkes can pack up to 384 missiles into their VLS for air defense, potentially resulting in a high PK shootdown of up to 192 missiles.

[weasel1962]

ESSM is quadpacked. HHQ-10 is a short-ranged system meant for point defense, whereas ESSM can have destroyers provide area missile defense coverage. There's been rumors that they'd quadpack DK-10, but no evidence for such has been shown.

Another issue is Chinese interest in EMALS VLS, which could potentially increase capability for short-ranged missile defense, but is likely going to be bulky and less suited for ESSM equivalent work. It's very impressive that the Arleigh Burkes can pack up to 384 missiles into their VLS for air defense, potentially resulting in a high PK shootdown of up to 192 missiles.

HQ-10 doesn't even take up any of the 112 VLS. It has a separate mount. What the HQ-10 does is cover the minimum engagement range of the HQ-9 with variants providing a layer, before the CIWS takes over. that's the purpose of point defense weapons, to mop up what gets thru the outside layers. There is speculation that the VLS can also mount the HQ-16 which adds another layer but its not needed due to the range of HQ-9 & CEC with other escorts.

https://www.afcea.org/content/china%E2% ... ve-weapons

What ESSM does is to extend the point engagement range. That means cheaper missiles than longer range ones like SM2s. There isn't a lot of reaction time left for short ranged weapons like HQ-10. ESSM increases that a bit but there is a limit. Hence for burke's VLS loadout, it won't be 384 ESSMs, since those VLS have to handle ASW, SSW, AAW (layered & TBM), strike (TLAM) etc duties. There are more than 100 missile-to mission requirements. I haven't seen or read ESSM loadouts exceeding 48 (generally 24-40) per vessel...ever. That includes for the 122 cell CGs.

Chinese battle groups operate layers as well, not just individually. Frigates are paired with Destroyers (incl 055) in flotillas i.e. they are housed in the same unit. That means adding mid-range HQ-16 to the mix.

Why makes 055 a bigger threat than their smaller 052C/D class are that missions sets are more limited to defense due to the number of VLS in the smaller vessels. The burkes/ticos carry a fair bit of TLAMs in the mix to allow for strike missions. That's what imho 055s will bring to the PLAN, sizeable surface strike capability (DH-10s). That's what makes the 055 priority targets.

What the USN doesn't need to do is take out the entire PLAN fleet in 72 hours. It just need to pull some of its teeth out starting with the sharpest ones.

[inst]

ESSM is quadpacked. HHQ-10 is a short-ranged system meant for point defense, whereas ESSM can have destroyers provide area missile defense coverage. There's been rumors that they'd quadpack DK-10, but no evidence for such has been shown.

Another issue is Chinese interest in EMALS VLS, which could potentially increase capability for short-ranged missile defense, but is likely going to be bulky and less suited for ESSM equivalent work. It's very impressive that the Arleigh Burkes can pack up to 384 missiles into their VLS for air defense, potentially resulting in a high PK shootdown of up to 192 missiles.

HQ-10 doesn't even take up any of the 112 VLS. It has a separate mount. What the HQ-10 does is cover the minimum engagement range of the HQ-9 with variants providing a layer, before the CIWS takes over. that's the purpose of point defense weapons, to mop up what gets thru the outside layers. There is speculation that the VLS can also mount the HQ-16 which adds another layer but its not needed due to the range of HQ-9 & CEC with other escorts.

https://www.afcea.org/content/china%E2% ... ve-weapons

What ESSM does is to extend the point engagement range. That means cheaper missiles than longer range ones like SM2s. There isn't a lot of reaction time left for short ranged weapons like HQ-10. ESSM increases that a bit but there is a limit. Hence for burke's VLS loadout, it won't be 384 ESSMs, since those VLS have to handle ASW, SSW, AAW (layered & TBM), strike (TLAM) etc duties. There are more than 100 missile-to mission requirements. I haven't seen or read ESSM loadouts exceeding 48 (generally 24-40) per vessel...ever. That includes for the 122 cell CGs.

Chinese battle groups operate layers as well, not just individually. Frigates are paired with Destroyers (incl 055) in flotillas i.e. they are housed in the same unit. That means adding mid-range HQ-16 to the mix.

Why makes 055 a bigger threat than their smaller 052C/D class are that missions sets are more limited to defense due to the number of VLS in the smaller vessels. The burkes/ticos carry a fair bit of TLAMs in the mix to allow for strike missions. That's what imho 055s will bring to the PLAN, sizeable surface strike capability (DH-10s). That's what makes the 055 priority targets.

What the USN doesn't need to do is take out the entire PLAN fleet in 72 hours. It just need to pull some of its teeth out starting with the sharpest ones.

The issue I'm bringing up isn't that the Chinese don't have ESSM-likes, but that they have no equivalent for the ESSM's quad-pack capability. The PLAN lacks a combination of the range and numbers the ESSM provides, and the ESSM makes the USN very resistant to attempts at supersonic saturation attacks.

For the PLAN, they can use HHQ-10s to provide essentially a RAM point defense on some of their ships, but the range is so low it's hard to imagine them layering point defense. HHQ-10 is a RAM equivalent, not a ESSM equivalent

[weasel1962]

As I didn't make myself clear earlier....

HQ-10 <10km - Most PLAN vessels carry this separate from VLS.
HQ-16A <10km to 40km - 054A frigates carry this, suggested but not confirmed if DDG VLS can carry this
HQ-16B <10km to 70km - 054A frigates carry this, suggested but not confirmed if DDG VLS can carry this
HQ-9A/B <10km - 100+km.

PLAN pairs 054A & 052/055 in similar units & thus BG i.e. they operate together.

Quad pack increases the number of missiles per VLS. HQ-10 increases the number of missile excl VLS via a separate mount. Carrying 24-48 in practice means only up to 12-36 VLS space savings. It helps but it doesn't mean the PLAN suffers from a numbers deficit.

Math (missile number):
Burke - 90-96 VLS = 126-132 missile carried (assuming 48 ESSM) covering 0-100+km.
055 - 112 VLS + 24 cell HQ-10 mounting = 136 missiles covering 0-100+km <- how is this a numbers disadvantage?

Math (range):

Burke - 48 ESSM to 50km + x SM-X to 100+km
054A - 32 HQ-16 to 40/70km + 055 - ? HQ-9 to 100+km <- Same effect. The only difference is 2 ships vs 1.

[inst]

As I didn't make myself clear earlier....

HQ-10 <10km - Most PLAN vessels carry this separate from VLS.
HQ-16A <10km to 40km - 054A frigates carry this, suggested but not confirmed if DDG VLS can carry this
HQ-16B <10km to 70km - 054A frigates carry this, suggested but not confirmed if DDG VLS can carry this
HQ-9A/B <10km - 100+km.

PLAN pairs 054A & 052/055 in similar units & thus BG i.e. they operate together.

Quad pack increases the number of missiles per VLS. HQ-10 increases the number of missile excl VLS via a separate mount. Carrying 24-48 in practice means only up to 12-36 VLS space savings. It helps but it doesn't mean the PLAN suffers from a numbers deficit.

Math (missile number):
Burke - 90-96 VLS = 126-132 missile carried (assuming 48 ESSM) covering 0-100+km.
055 - 112 VLS + 24 cell HQ-10 mounting = 136 missiles covering 0-100+km <- how is this a numbers disadvantage?

Math (range):

Burke - 48 ESSM to 50km + x SM-X to 100+km
054A - 32 HQ-16 to 40/70km + 055 - ? HQ-9 to 100+km <- Same effect. The only difference is 2 ships vs 1.

I'm thinking of this less as a ship vs ship engagement, and more as a fleet vs fleet or fleet vs air-wing engagement. Since the PLAN is being built to counter the USN / USAF, even before the worsening of Sino-US tensions, the HHQ-10 has to deal with massive salvos of missiles, and given the extremely limited ranges, it's questionable as to whether a fleet could successfully defend itself using HHQ-10 vs large salvos of LRASM. The limited range of HHQ-10 means that the cooperative aspect, where multiple ships launch anti-missiles, is very limited, or requires the PLAN to be tightly packed. If we're talking about an anti-US scenario for the Chinese, the nuclear option has to be considered and a bunch of Type 055s bunched together makes them a tempting target for a tactical nuclear strike, should it come to that.

The ESSM, in contrast, allows Arleigh Burkes and Ticonderogas to defend USN assets from a wide area.

Moreover, long-range anti-missiles have the advantage that against slow missiles like the older C-80X series, you have the option to launch multiple salvos. If the first salvo misses something, you don't have to resort to CIWS to kill the remaining missiles, but rather you can use additional missiles to give another shot at taking out the escapees before you have to open up the CIWS.