S-300 VS. TLAM

[sferrin]

Russian systems are quite limited in comparison.

Tor and Pantsir don't seem too shabby.

[hornetfinn]

Russian systems are quite limited in comparison.

Tor and Pantsir don't seem too shabby.

True, they can be effective. However when compared as total systems, they have some limitations. For example a single NASAMS battery can engage 72 targets simultaneously given it has that many missiles available. It would take at least 18 units of the latest Tor or Pantsir versions to even theoretically equal that and in real world many more since they are far more limited with their CLOS guidance vs. fully fire and forget missiles used in NASAMS (AMRAAM, AIM-9X). Finland has NASAMS systems as they replaced Russian made SA-11 Buk systems we had prior. Buk had longer range and better altitude coverage, but otherwise NASAMS is far superior (networking, ECCM, firepower, sensor capabilities) and even the range/altitude is now being addressed with AMRAAM-ER and ESSM missiles. Our people have seen Tor and Pantsir systems up close in many versions and have not been particularly impressed overall. Not to say they aren't dangerous systems but they have some serious limitations when compared with Western systems with more advanced and flexible technology. Especially so against difficult situations like against 50+ nearly simultaneous TLAMs.

[arian]

As a former ADA guy, I can tell you that modern cruise missiles are just horrible for the defending systems. They fly at very low altitudes and/or have very low RCS and thermal signature which means they are very difficult to detect while en route to target. Especially so because they fly preplanned routes which are designed to maximize chance of getting to target by avoiding best defending systems and using terrain masking to avoid/delay detection. What makes things worse is that they are usually arriving almost simultaneously to target from different directions. This makes it really tough for defending systems to engage them in time. AD systems might kill couple of them, but not necessarily enough to matter much.

S-300 is not that well suited system to engage cruise missiles. It's long range and powerful missiles are not much of a use when engagement ranges are less than 30 km in ideal conditions and significantly less in real life conditions. Syrian terrain is mostly rough and pretty much guarantees that Pantsir and S-300 have fairly similar engagement ranges against TLAMs. Best AD systems to defend against cruise missiles are actually Western. Systems like NASAMS, Spyder and IRIS-T SLM can cover large geographical areas with multiple sensors at fairly low cost and have missiles and sensors that are well suited to engage low flying cruise missiles. They can also engage very large number of targets simultaneously and automatically which is critical in engaging cruise missile volleys. These can be backed up by CIWS type systems like Oerlikon Skyguard/Skyshield to take out leakers. Russian systems are quite limited in comparison.

Certainly there would have been very little they could have done no matter what the situation.

Certainly S-400 would have no view at all of the area the cruise missiles were flying from (terrain is blocking the view from Latakia to Tartus)

If, however, the Russians do have an S-300 battery in Tartus (as they claim), and if it were operational, one would assume they may have been able to at least detect the cruise missiles flying in from the sea, as well as the missiles gained altitude to go over the mountain pass. The cruise missiles would have flown within 15km of Tartus, and even at the point at which they would be climbing over rough terrain to go over the mountain pass, they would be within 25km of Tartus.

[armedupdate]

A spam of 59 cruise missiles seems almost impossible to stop. The simple clutter of cruise missiles will confuse radar returns and only targets on in front of the spam will be hit. Soon the formation will simply overwhelm the target.

Cruise missiles like ballistic missiles are very nasty opponents.

[hornetfinn]

Certainly there would have been very little they could have done no matter what the situation.

Certainly S-400 would have no view at all of the area the cruise missiles were flying from (terrain is blocking the view from Latakia to Tartus)

If, however, the Russians do have an S-300 battery in Tartus (as they claim), and if it were operational, one would assume they may have been able to at least detect the cruise missiles flying in from the sea, as well as the missiles gained altitude to go over the mountain pass. The cruise missiles would have flown within 15km of Tartus, and even at the point at which they would be climbing over rough terrain to go over the mountain pass, they would be within 25km of Tartus.

Possibly so depending on how the battery was organized, situated, oriented and operated. Detecting small targets low over water is pretty tough and detection ranges can vary wildly depending on conditions. Same with rough terrain as both would give a lot of ground clutter and multipath returns. What it would have mattered if they were detected? Russians were already told pretty accurately (AFAIK) when and where they were going to be used.

[hornetfinn]

A spam of 59 cruise missiles seems almost impossible to stop. The simple clutter of cruise missiles will confuse radar returns and only targets on in front of the spam will be hit. Soon the formation will simply overwhelm the target.

Cruise missiles like ballistic missiles are very nasty opponents.

Very true. Cruise missiles especially are difficult since they are much cheaper and thus far more numerous than ballistic missiles. They also have much better strategic and tactical flexibility as they can be launched from so many platforms (ships, submarines, bombers, fighter aircraft, ground launchers). Of course ballistic missiles have their own strenghts with their speed and ToT.

[madrat]

Does anybody have any timeline of the attack on the airbase?

It could have practically started and finished in a hand full of minutes.

[terrygedran]

Russian systems are quite limited in comparison.

Tor and Pantsir don't seem too shabby.

True, they can be effective. However when compared as total systems, they have some limitations. For example a single NASAMS battery can engage 72 targets simultaneously given it has that many missiles available. It would take at least 18 units of the latest Tor or Pantsir versions to even theoretically equal that and in real world many more since they are far more limited .

A complete NASAMS 2 battery consists of 12 missile launchers (LCHR) (each one carrying six AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles), eight radars (AN/MPQ-64 F1 Improved Sentinel X band 3D radar), one fire control centre (CTOC), one electro-optical camera vehicle (MSP500) and one Tactical Control Cell (TCC) vehicle.

12+8+1+1+1=23

23 vehicle and 72 missiles


Tor-M2E
Ammunition of the Tor-M2 includes 8 missiles 9M331 or 16 missiles 9M338 with increased altitude and range

Typically, a battery of four Tor vehicles is accompanied by the mobile Ranzhir-M (Russian: "Ранжир-М") command center, which provides automatic interaction with the SA-15,8,13,16. It allows for efficient allocation of tasks between the individual Tor crews and allows each TLAR to be linked into a wider air defense system, thereby increasing target detection range and reducing reaction time.

Tor vehicles is accompanied by the mobile Polyana-D4 which provides automatic interaction with the SA-15,17,19,23 (S-300V, Buk, Tor, Tunguska), (integrates all functions of several different systems into a single whole + various air force aircraft + direct transfer of target designation)

System is fully automated(no need people to operate)


Pantsir-S1

The specific feature of the Pantsir-S1 system is the combination of a multiple-band target acquisition and tracking system in conjunction with a combined missile and gun armament creating a continuous target engagement zone from 5 m (16 ft) height and 200 m (660 ft) range up to 15 km (9.3 mi) height and 20 km (12 mi) range, even without any external support.

Using a digital data link system up to six Pantsir-S1 combat vehicle can operate in various modes.

Stand alone combat operation: All the combat sequence from detecting a target to its engagement is fulfilled by a single Pantsir-S1 combat vehicle without employing other assets.
Operation within a battery ("master-slave"): One Pantsir-S1 operates both as combat vehicle and as "master" command post. 3 to 5 Pantsir-S1 combat vehicles acting as "slave" receive target designation data from the "master" and subsequently fulfil all the combat operation stages.
Operation within a command post: The command post sends target designations to the Pantsir-S1 combat vehicles and subsequently fulfill the designation order.
Operation within a battery with command post and early warning radar: The command post receives air situation picture from a connected early warning radar and sends target designations to the Pantsir-S1 combat vehicles and subsequently fulfil the designation order.

The Pantsir-S1 fire control system includes a target acquisition radar and dual waveband tracking radar (designation 1RS2-1E for export models), which operates in the UHF and EHF waveband. Detection range is 32–36 kilometres (20–22 mi) and tracking range is 24–28 kilometres (15–17 mi) for a target with 2 m2 (22 sq ft) RCS. Can also reliably achieve more, to 45 km (28 mi). This radar tracks both targets and the surface-to-air missile while in flight. Minimum target size 2–3 square centimetres (0.31–0.47 sq in) (0.0004 square metres (0.0043 sq ft))

As well as radar, the fire control system also has an electro-optic channel with long-wave thermal imager and infrared direction finder, including digital signal processing and automatic target tracking. A simplified, lower-cost version of Pantsir-S1 is also being developed for export, with only the electro-optic fire control system fitted.

The two independent guidance channels—radar and electro-optic—allow two targets to be engaged simultaneously. And four for more recent options (2012). Maximum engagement rate is up to 10-12 targets per minute.

Types of purposes. Aircraft, UAVs, helicopters, anti-radar missiles (detection range of AGM-88 HARM missile 13–15 kilometres (8.1–9.3 mi)), air-launched cruise missiles

[sferrin]

Does anybody have any timeline of the attack on the airbase?

It could have practically started and finished in a hand full of minutes.

They're pretty good at coordinating Time On Target. They whole thing could have been over in seconds.

[arian]

terrygedran, yes we have access to Wikipedia too.

The point is simultaneous target engagement. When you have a small time window, and a swarm of missiles, and perhaps missiles coming from multiple direction, then the weaknesses of any system that isn't 360 deg and armed with fire and forget missiles become problematic.

[milosh]

Without mast mounted radars I don't think S-300 would be effective against low flyers. Are those radars in russian base? I didn't saw them and they have SHORAD to protect them against low flyers so there isn't real need for mast radars.

[arian]

Without mast mounted radars I don't think S-300 would be effective against low flyers. Are those radars in russian base? I didn't saw them and they have SHORAD to protect them against low flyers so there isn't real need for mast radars.

How would those SHORADs get early warning of an attack? They too would be limited to a very short response time. Especially given the terrain there being very mountainous.

There is also no evidence any Russian S-300s are anywhere near the area. The story that they are in Tartus seems BS. By some accounts, the Russian S-300 is actually southeast of Aleppo.

[snypa777]

Without mast mounted radars I don't think S-300 would be effective against low flyers. Are those radars in russian base? I didn't saw them and they have SHORAD to protect them against low flyers so there isn't real need for mast radars.

How would those SHORADs get early warning of an attack? They too would be limited to a very short response time. Especially given the terrain there being very mountainous.

There is also no evidence any Russian S-300s are anywhere near the area. The story that they are in Tartus seems BS. By some accounts, the Russian S-300 is actually southeast of Aleppo.

I seem to recall that some Russian Navy hulls were anchored off Tartus equipped with the Naval variant of S-300.
maybe these are what were quoted?

[snypa777]

1. The Russian military are not responsible for the air defense of Syria.
2. Since the Russians were not being targeted they were stood down and just "watched", pretty much what they have been doing since the start, why risk shooting down a coalition aircraft?
Moscow doesn't want to go down that route, the rhetoric is for the fan boys and social media Putin sycophants.

[arian]

I seem to recall that some Russian Navy hulls were anchored off Tartus equipped with the Naval variant of S-300.
maybe these are what were quoted?

No this was based on RT/Sputnik/TASS articles claiming directly that S-300 had been deployed in Tartus (including pictures of the ground-based launchers in he article, although stock photos of course).

Like this one: http://tass.com/defense/904153

Now I have little doubt that this is, like most such articles, false.