piston wrote:
Also I am curious about what kind of modernization SA-2/3/6 had, any particular info would be great...
The only specific SAM variant I know of is the S-75M2 Volkhov (SA-2F) version of the SA-2 - apparently used by Iraq in the 80s - no idea on the other types!
Here is some info I dug out from a Gulf air war survey - its only analysis from the US side though.......
The Iraqi Air Defense System Beyond its aircraft, Iraq depended on a complex air defense network. The Iraqi system was highly centralized; four sectors, each with a Sector Operations Center (SOC), controlled air and air defense assets. The focus of that network was on meeting two threats: long distance Israeli air attacks or that posed by the Iranian Air Force, what little remained after the war. Under each SOC, Intercept Operation Centers (IOCs) ran ground control intercepts and SAM defenses and coordinated the flow of information from individual radar stations and visual reporting sites to the SOCs [DELETED].
Information collated at the center then flowed back down to antiaircraft units, air bases, and SAM sites.
At the center, the Air Defense Operations Center (ADOC) in Baghdad made the crucial decisions, while a French-designed computer system (KARI Iraq spelled backwards in French) tied the network's diverse pieces together. [DELETED] KARI also possessed “land line and/or microwave (either troposcatter or line-of-sight)” to lower levels of command. Redundant land lines tied the section centers to the national command level, while the Iraqis placed the intercept centers near existing telecommunication trunks capable of carrying both voice and data communications. The French designed system modems so that each node could easily switch from one form of communication to another.293 The Iraqis also provided extensive protection to both types of centers by placing them in hardened shelters.
As the war with the Coalition loomed, the Iraqi leadership viewed the strategic purpose of its air defenses as providing the means for the nation to ride out an air campaign. The defenses were to inflict heavy enough losses on the attackers to bring on a ground campaign. The primary tools for defending Iraqi air space were SAM and antiaircraft forces. On paper, active air defenses were indeed impressive: five hundred radars located in no less than one hundred sites, SA-2 batteries, SA-3 batteries, SA-6 batteries, SA-8, and ROLAND I/II systems covered different areas of the nation. The air defense system controlled about 8,000 antiaircraft pieces, but the percentage devoted to the defense of strategic targets as opposed to the defense of the army in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations is not known. Nevertheless, the Iraqis deployed approximately 4,000 fixed and mobile antiaircraft artillery pieces and SAMs around Baghdad.
Not surprisingly, the Iraqis tied the SAMs closely to computer KARI. However, antiaircraft artillery, relied on barrage firing on preset azimuths to hit attacking aircraft.295 The Iraqis believed that a combination of SAMs and antiaircraft artillery would impose sufficient attrition on attacking forces; at medium to high altitudes SAMs would shoot down many Coalition aircraft; should the attackers go low, then antiaircraft guns would inflict heavy casualties. Finally, Iraqi aircraft, protected by hardened aircraft shelters, could intervene at selected moments to add to Coalition losses.
Unfortunately for the Iraqis, KARI possessed a number of weaknesses. French experts oriented the system to protect Iraq from attack from the east (Iran) and west (Israel). Coverage towards Saudi Arabia was weak. SAM and antiaircraft defenses were strong in some sectors; admittedly, Baghdad was an extraordinarily heavily defended target. Strong air defenses also protected Basra, Scud-launching sites in western Iraq, and Iraq's northern oil fields. But much of the rest of the country lay open a factor that allowed allied aircraft to approach targets from different directions. Moreover, the layout of the western and central sectors created a dead zone pointed directly at Baghdad from Saudi Arabia.296 Not surprisingly, Iraqi defensive systems could only handle threat levels consistent with Middle Eastern force structures.297 Indeed, to the Iraqis, the system's capacity to track targets seemed more than sufficient.
But what Coalition air forces could throw at the Iraqis was something well beyond the capacity of Iraqi information, command and control, and weapons system capabilities.299 The largest weakness, however, lay in the fact that Iraqi operators and pilots could not handle either the technological or tactical competence of Coalition forces. Exacerbating their deficiencies was the low level of training and preparation among Iraqis in comparison to the levels of their opponents.
Coalition air planners in Riyadh realized early in Desert Shield that KARI, which had been designed, built, and installed by the French firm Thompson CSF, was the nervous system of Iraq's air defenses. As of 17 January 1991, KARI consisted of early-warning and low-altitude radars, over two dozen operations centers, more than one hundred reporting and control posts, computers and software, line-of-sight microwave and troposcatter Ccommunications links, and hardware interfaces.1158
Construction of this system had began in the late 1970s, but the Iraqis had not declared it fully operational until 1987. Given the limited capabilities of Iraqi interceptors detailed in the preceding section, the aspect of the KARI system of greatest interest to Desert Storm air planners was its ability to control and employ radar-guided or “strategic” SAMs (principally the radar-guided SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6, but also the shorter-range Roland and SA-8).1161 In this regard, several points should be noted:
First, the strategic SAMs were not widely dispersed throughout Iraq. Instead, they were concentrated in dense pockets around potential high-value target areas (Mosul, Kirkuk, H-3, the Baghdad area, Basra, etc.).1162 As Figure 8 indicates, the vast majority of Iraqi airspace was not covered by radar-guided SAMs.
Second, while the precise linkages and interfaces between the IOCs and SAM batteries were not well understood going into the conflict, it appears likely that landlines of some sort existed to most fire units and reporting posts.1
Iraqi SAM Systems SA-2 Guideline/SA-3 GOA The SA-2 and SA-3 systems formed the backbone of the Iraqi air defense system. These older systems were usually supplemented by an SA-6 battery.30 The SA-2, while updated somewhat, was originally designed to go against the B-52 and presented few problems to modern, fast moving, maneuverable fighter aircraft. It had a range of twenty seven nautical miles and was designed for high-altitude targets.32 The SA-3, developed shortly after the SA-2, had a range of fourteen miles and was designed to defeat low- to medium-altitude aircraft
SA-6 Gainful The SA-6 was developed in the 1960s to protect maneuvering ground units. Originally employed by the Iraqis in that capacity, it was withdrawn from frontline units during the Iran-Iraq War to protect key strategic sites. The SA-6 had a range of thirteen miles and was designed to be used mainly against very-low- to medium-altitude threats.38 After the Iran-Iraq War, many of the SA-6 batteries were returned to their ground units, particularly the Republican Guards.
Roland The French Roland was another short-range missile designed to protect tactical ground units. It had a range of approximately three and one half miles.42 Approximately thirteen Roland I (clear weather) systems and one hundred Roland II (all weather) systems had been sold to Iraq. By the beginning of the Gulf War, it appeared that most Rolands had been incorporated into the strategic air defense system protecting high-value targets.4
SA-8 Gecko The SA-8 was another tactical SAM designed to protect maneuver units. However, most SA-8s had been incorporated into the joint defense of strategically important areas, as had the SA-6s. The SA-8 had a maximum range of six nautical miles.
SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13 Gopher As Desert Storm approached, the only mounted systems organic to Army Air Defense units apparently were the SA-9 and SA-13s. These short-range systems used infrared seekers and could be foiled by flare countermeasures. However, fired against an unaware target, they could be quite effective. The SA-9 and SA-13s were usually used in conjunction with the highly capable ZSU-23/4 AAA weapon system with its Gun Dish radar. The ZSU-23/4 was generally considered the most lethal threat to low-flying aircraft.
Man Portable Air Defense SAMs (Man PADS) The Iraqis had SA-14s and over 3,000 SA-7s. Both were small, shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles used for close-in defense. The SA-7 (Grail) was believed to be a copy of the U.S. Redeye infrared surface-to-air missile. The SA-7 had a range of about two-and-one-half nautical miles and had to be fired at the heat created by an aircraft's exhaust.48 The SA-14 had a range of about three nautical miles and had an improved all-aspect seeker. SA-7s and SA-14s were distributed throughout the Iraqi Army and Air Defense Forces. Overall, infrared surface-to-air missiles were credited with downing or damaging several Coalition aircraft.
Hawk Iraqi forces captured a number of U.S.-made Hawk SAM batteries from the Kuwaitis. Hawk was a highly capable missile with excellent low-altitude and ECM capabilities. Since the Iraqis proved unable to operate the Hawk, it was not a factor in Desert Storm, although there was initial concern that it might be used.
AntiAircraft Artillery (AAA) Numerically, the most important element of the Iraqi Air Defense system was the antiaircraft artillery. Table 2 is a list of the number and country of origin of the various AAA weapons. These 7,500 or more AAA weapons proved to be the most effective Iraqi antiaircraft systems in both the Iran-Iraq War and in Desert Storm. As with other Iraqi air defense weapon systems, AAA was deployed to protect the most important strategic locations. AAA systems used with co-located SAM systems presented a formidable threat to Coalition aircraft. Some post-war evaluations of Iraqi tactics indicated that the purpose of SAMs was not to destroy attack-ing aircraft as much as to force Coalition aircraft to maneuver into the AAA envelope
06 Jun 2014, 11:50
