J-20 goes operational again

The PLA strategy for SCS is simple. Do nothing.

The USAF/USN can basically destroy all Chinese infrastructure in the SCS. However, this is basically a declaration of war where the initiative is on the Chinese side to decide the level of escalation e.g. striking Guam or even Hawaii in return. There are no permanent air basing on the island so the benefits of striking these are limited at best.

The USN can of course invade the ("artificial") islands but basically they turn into an occupation force itself because the US has no ownership claims. It can of course pass the ownership to various claimants. However none of these are capable of defending the islands on their own which necessitates a permanent (and likely illegal) US occupation force.

This would be complex to execute because all this happens within the range of the full submarine fleet of the PLAN to which shipping interdiction is what they are designed for. With no SoSUS equivalent, the US would have to deploy a large part of its fleet and air assets to sanitize the area. That basically means no one (including Japan, Korea, Taiwan etc) can use the SCS for commercial shipping. Now what would the US gain out of this? Absolutely nothing.

FONOPs are the appropriate response to the SCS to which the Chinese themselves can't do anything. Note, none of these actually need a J-20.

Its only a H-6 detachment to Kashgar airport (not new and they do it routinely). Delhi is actually within unrefuelled range of H-6 bases in Shaodong/Hengyang (~3500km). However, Kashgar (~1000+km) allows strikes with significant reduction in warning times.

India faces 2 theater commands (Western-WTC and Southern-STC). Tibet is in WTC. Southern covers Yunnan and Sichuan provinces. WTC has 9 brigades (5 J7, 1 J8, 1 JH7, 2 J11). STC has 23 brigades (5 J7, 5 J10, 7 J11/Su30, 2 JH7, 4 H6). Each PLAAF air brigade has ~28 aircraft vs 18 per IAF sqn, that’s equivalent of 48 IAF squadrons facing India before reinforcements.

Deployment wise, the Ladakh sector (WTC) has 23 airports within 750nm of Ladakh (flanker radius), 8 of which are within 500nm. Of the 23, only 3 are located at extreme high altitudes (EHEL). These can be regarded as defensive

STC has significantly more airports and also more of these are at extreme high altitudes. However there are no regular PLAAF/PLAN brigades based at EHEL locations. Most of these airbases are within flanker range of Arunachal Pradesh. STC also has broader sector responsibilities with India in the west, SCS in the south and Taiwan in the east, hence the larger number of brigades. The IAF only has 3 sqns of fighters (all Su-30s) based in the east but can also redeploy if required. Nevertheless, this will likely be the most heavily outnumbered sector. Air superiority is key in mountainous regions because of the ability to stage enveloping air/heliborne assaults and basically cut off the logistics.

Bump.

The PLA strategy for SCS is simple. Do nothing.

The USAF/USN can basically destroy all Chinese infrastructure in the SCS. However, this is basically a declaration of war where the initiative is on the Chinese side to decide the level of escalation e.g. striking Guam or even Hawaii in return. There are no permanent air basing on the island so the benefits of striking these are limited at best.

The USN can of course invade the ("artificial") islands but basically they turn into an occupation force itself because the US has no ownership claims. It can of course pass the ownership to various claimants. However none of these are capable of defending the islands on their own which necessitates a permanent (and likely illegal) US occupation force.

This would be complex to execute because all this happens within the range of the full submarine fleet of the PLAN to which shipping interdiction is what they are designed for. With no SoSUS equivalent, the US would have to deploy a large part of its fleet and air assets to sanitize the area. That basically means no one (including Japan, Korea, Taiwan etc) can use the SCS for commercial shipping. Now what would the US gain out of this? Absolutely nothing.

FONOPs are the appropriate response to the SCS to which the Chinese themselves can't do anything. Note, none of these actually need a J-20.

Really did yoy just throw the Chinese Submarine force our as a credible force? Are you smoking?

Really did yoy just throw the Chinese Submarine force our as a credible force? Are you smoking?

Its not really difficult interdicting commercial shipping esp in the littorals.

P.s. I don't smoke.

The PLA strategy for SCS is simple. Do nothing.

The USAF/USN can basically destroy all Chinese infrastructure in the SCS. However, this is basically a declaration of war where the initiative is on the Chinese side to decide the level of escalation e.g. striking Guam or even Hawaii in return. There are no permanent air basing on the island so the benefits of striking these are limited at best.

The USN can of course invade the ("artificial") islands but basically they turn into an occupation force itself because the US has no ownership claims. It can of course pass the ownership to various claimants. However none of these are capable of defending the islands on their own which necessitates a permanent (and likely illegal) US occupation force.

This would be complex to execute because all this happens within the range of the full submarine fleet of the PLAN to which shipping interdiction is what they are designed for. With no SoSUS equivalent, the US would have to deploy a large part of its fleet and air assets to sanitize the area. That basically means no one (including Japan, Korea, Taiwan etc) can use the SCS for commercial shipping. Now what would the US gain out of this? Absolutely nothing.

FONOPs are the appropriate response to the SCS to which the Chinese themselves can't do anything. Note, none of these actually need a J-20.

The US and her Allies have a similar strategy. They just ignore Chinese Claims and travel within the 12 miles of any of the islands that they have reclaimed. Which, they're powerless to stop...

China seems to have now pissed off Russia.
The foreign policy of this regime is a mess.
You can't fight the entire world.

Gravitas: Why Russia suspended the delivery of S-…: https://youtu.be/NGRm26JE2fg
Russian equipment is extremely important at this point for China.
The need the engine to power the J-20.

Your ambassador cannot claim a Russian city as your own without blow back.

Are you talking about them claiming vladivostok?
Lol Russia is one of there last allies.

https://www.financialexpress.com/world- ... a/2015817/

Are you talking about them claiming vladivostok?
Lol Russia is one of there last allies.

https://www.financialexpress.com/world- ... a/2015817/

That left a mark with Putin and the other hardliners I'm sure. It is one of Russia's major historical victories.

Its going to be the boxer rebellion all over again.
China cant fight the world.

Its going to be the boxer rebellion all over again.
China cant fight the world.

There is a 'Lifeboat Theory' out there in the intelligence community. CCP leaders allegedly have planned perhaps to run away from the boogieman (itself) during a foreboding crisis (manmade flooding) that throws the nation in turmoil from both internal and external actors. Leaders do seem to be plotting a train wreck while stockpiling assets around the globe for golden parachutes. The idea almost evokes the idea of Nero playing the fiddle while Rome burns, but from the safety of the Nile.

Border agreements signed in the post opium war period tend not to attract positive reviews in China. The full border demarcation was agreed in 2008 but that's pre-Xi (then under Hu).

So why dig up history again? From an external perspective, it can be called leverage. Xi could be learning from Trump. However, more likely this whole Vladivostok show is more an internal show. The Hu clique is gaining some support over the past few years and this can be a reminder to internal elements on who "lost" Vladivostok. That's my 2 yuan worth.

China has one and one only ally: China.

I learned this aftee years of dealing with chinese coworkers.

Anyway, i want to casually remind China has strategicassets for its economy even in Africa.

Stuff that needs to be defended.

Last thing, dont forget India. I cant see them not taking advantage of a, let's say , distracted China.

China has one and one only ally: China.

I learned this aftee years of dealing with chinese coworkers.

Anyway, i want to casually remind China has strategicassets for its economy even in Africa.

Stuff that needs to be defended.

Last thing, dont forget India. I cant see them not taking advantage of a, let's say , distracted China.

If that's the case (assets need to be defended elsewhere), they need to really beef up their air/sea power. Which I understand is underway but let's be honest - there's a lot of work still left to do. The Chinese Navy is still a white water fleet, and will likely stay that way for some time. Their air power is growing by leaps and bounds, but still comes up woefully short on key assets like air to air refueling, AWACS and heavy transport aircraft.

They really need a bomber with intercontinental range, a large and diverse tanker/transport fleet as well as greatly expanded air to ground capability of its tactical aircraft. That's a lot to fund, a lot to keep funding and a lot to learn. It's in perhaps this last metric where they're found most wanting. It may well be China ends up exactly as it (incorrectly) predicted US armed forces to be at one time: A paper tiger...

Since they settled on the kj-500, they've got the production line churning those out. It's now standard to see those operating with the fighters. Seems to have relegated the ~10 kj-200s "balanced beam" and 4 kj-2000s.

Also photos of the new kj-600 with balanced beam also spotted. These should equip the next CV. AWACs capability is definitely growing.

At the rate they are churning out those Y-20s, it won't be "woefully short" for long. What's interesting is their use of "civilian" transports. Not exactly a small fleet but heavies are relatively fewer right now. Trains/sea are still their primary mode of transport in country. No significant overseas deployment required yet.