J-20 goes operational again

[weasel1962]

Depends. No need to strike mainland China in a NK scenario but likely to be different for Taiwan.

Probably declare a no fly, no launch zone across a couple of Chinese eastern provinces in two stages. First stage maybe 300nm, then push out 500-700nm from ROC. Kill zone will make it easier to enforce (Serbian/Iraq precedent).

May not need Linebacker-styled campaigns. Linebacker stories anyone?

[boogieman]

Plausible. Although bear in mind that would mean operating in the presence of OTH/VHF land based radars, long range SAM (HQ9) etc etc. Not ideal to say the least.

[weasel1962]

SAMs are over-rated. Sam/GCI radars will be taken out early. The F-35's stealth is exactly designed for those missions. The only reason why it won't be a short war is cos target rich environment. Will take time to go thru that target list.

The Chinese are starting to realise this. Hence emphasis on air combat vs stealth. J-20s went to aggressor training brigades first before combat operational brigade.

[milosh]

I don't think anyone here questions the fact that our jets would kick all kinds of PLAAF posterior in the air if push came to shove. As I said earlier, the Chinese answer to this problem is probably not to tackle us Battle of Britain style in the air, but to cripple our airpower by interdicting our airbases with BM and LACM launched from within China's own borders, while using the threat of nuclear escalation to deter attacks on mainland China itself.

I suspect our RoE may have a significant impact on the outcome since fighting China without being able to hit them on the mainland (while they shower the first and second island chains with DF-XX and CJ/DH-XX) would be like fighting with one arm tied behind our back.

I think J-20 and J-31 will narrow gap a lot. Stealth vs Stealth will be more like WVR then BVR. And J-20/31 will have support of whole chinese war machinery if war is close to China. Massive radar network and SAM network also AEW primarily stealthy flying radars like massive Divine eagle which is still in development and IMO is main reason why Chinese AWACS fleet development is quite slow.

[jessmo112]

I don't think anyone here questions the fact that our jets would kick all kinds of PLAAF posterior in the air if push came to shove. As I said earlier, the Chinese answer to this problem is probably not to tackle us Battle of Britain style in the air, but to cripple our airpower by interdicting our airbases with BM and LACM launched from within China's own borders, while using the threat of nuclear escalation to deter attacks on mainland China itself.

I suspect our RoE may have a significant impact on the outcome since fighting China without being able to hit them on the mainland (while they shower the first and second island chains with DF-XX and CJ/DH-XX) would be like fighting with one arm tied behind our back.

I think J-20 and J-31 will narrow gap a lot. Stealth vs Stealth will be more like WVR then BVR. And J-20/31 will have support of whole chinese war machinery if war is close to China. Massive radar network and SAM network also AEW primarily stealthy flying radars like massive Divine eagle which is still in development and IMO is main reason why Chinese AWACS fleet development is quite slow.

Thats the problem your not understanding.

1. If China hasn't mastered how to fight in this paradigm the results will be the same. The U.S. has had time to hone stealth versus stealth for 20+ years now.
The F-35 flying test bed was developing tactics way back in 2010 this is public record.

2. You can have a large honking awacs or a digital Aesa. But its hard to do both. Even the USN has to stop the E-2 dish from spinning to put the radar in another digital mode. The reason for this is physics. When your dealing with stealth and radars it comes down to physics.

3. The Majority of planes on both sides will die on the ground. The problem the Chinese have is that currently the F-35 is flying figure 8s over the very same air defenses the Chinese are using.
The Allies have a dedicated plan for stopping Chinese tac air. The Chinese do not. S-300 400 and the like are all compromised. Shutting down the bases is not a realistic strategy. They allies basing is to dispersed and numerous. Throw Stovl stealth planes and tactical bombers in the mix, and now its impossible.

[boogieman]

I don't think anyone here questions the fact that our jets would kick all kinds of PLAAF posterior in the air if push came to shove. As I said earlier, the Chinese answer to this problem is probably not to tackle us Battle of Britain style in the air, but to cripple our airpower by interdicting our airbases with BM and LACM launched from within China's own borders, while using the threat of nuclear escalation to deter attacks on mainland China itself.

I suspect our RoE may have a significant impact on the outcome since fighting China without being able to hit them on the mainland (while they shower the first and second island chains with DF-XX and CJ/DH-XX) would be like fighting with one arm tied behind our back.

I think J-20 and J-31 will narrow gap a lot. Stealth vs Stealth will be more like WVR then BVR. And J-20/31 will have support of whole chinese war machinery if war is close to China. Massive radar network and SAM network also AEW primarily stealthy flying radars like massive Divine eagle which is still in development and IMO is main reason why Chinese AWACS fleet development is quite slow.

I guess it depends on how quickly the PLAAF can field significant quantities of J20, J31, JH-XX and H-20. They would certainly make for more difficult opponents than the current crop of J-10/11/15/16, JH-7 and H-6. By the time J20 and J31 are widespread in the PLAAF (if ever for the latter) the U.S and allies will have modernised too, so it's difficult to stare into the crystal ball and predict exactly how everything will stack up. I do expect them to continue to modernise rapidly, so it will be interesting to see what the U.S can achieve now that it is shifting from ~20 years of focus on COIN to prioritising peer competition.

[milosh]

2. You can have a large honking awacs or a digital Aesa. But its hard to do both. Even the USN has to stop the E-2 dish from spinning to put the radar in another digital mode. The reason for this is physics. When your dealing with stealth and radars it comes down to physics.

I am not talking about classic AWACS, I am talking abou UAV which replace AWACS. Divine Eagle for example, it is still prototype and final shape will be different.

3. The Majority of planes on both sides will die on the ground. The problem the Chinese have is that currently the F-35 is flying figure 8s over the very same air defenses the Chinese are using.
The Allies have a dedicated plan for stopping Chinese tac air. The Chinese do not. S-300 400 and the like are all compromised. Shutting down the bases is not a realistic strategy. They allies basing is to dispersed and numerous. Throw Stovl stealth planes and tactical bombers in the mix, and now its impossible.

I really doubt F-35 can fly close to modern SAM but it surely penalized them a lot. But I am not talking about SAMs, I talking about air force and SAM&radar network symbiosis.

Chinese air force will be back by SAMs and radar network, so if China have lot of stealths those stealths don't need to rely on its radars to detect F-35. They will get info from other radars. On other hand I don't see from where F-35 will get info expect from its own radar. E-3 replacement isn't even on paper and even that can't detect J-20/31 from safe distance.

What is need is big UAV with long wave band radar.

So from defensive standpoint Chinese stealths have noticable advantage over F-35, on other hand they will be in similar problem if they attack Japan for example. Then ground radars and SAM will be big bonus to F-35.

[jessmo112]

1. Milosh your doubts are irrelevant.
The F-22 and F-35 have flow all around the S-300 and S-400 with no problems.

2. A large area search Radar must be a certain size its limited by physics. Thats the reason why wide area search radars are very large. And fire control radars are smaller and in the X-band. You can put an Aesa on a drone but it still will be in the X-band.
The bandwidth is affected by array size.
(If Im explaining it wrong someone correct me)

3. Your not going to have those ground radar tracks in a wartime. GCI will die a painful death.
Anything emmiting will be bombed burned microwaved, Electromagnetic pulsed, or jammed.

The U.S. has been playing this game far longer than the Chinese. But hey... Some part of me welcomes the ignorance and arrogance of modern China.
Its one thing to not know, its another thing to not know you don't know.

[nutshell]

Wasnt "Chip" Burke the one that accidently spilled the beans on the F35 not getting painted by S300? (RedFlag 17 or 18, memory is failing).

Was a pilot, anyway.

[charlielima223]

On other hand I don't see from where F-35 will get info expect from its own radar. E-3 replacement isn't even on paper and even that can't detect J-20/31 from safe distance.

So from defensive standpoint Chinese stealths have noticable advantage over F-35, on other hand they will be in similar problem if they attack Japan for example. Then ground radars and SAM will be big bonus to F-35.

F-22 and F-35 require little to no support from E-3 and E-2 or other aircraft of similar role/capacity. Their own radars, sensors, and integration with the same aircraft type allow for their own self contained capability. This has been echoed by both F-22 and F-35 pilots and strategists.
This has been seen in high end exercises with F-22 and F-35s flying ahead of everyone else. In Syria F-22s were used as forward ISR.

In a hypothetical of a Chinese J-20 or J-31 attempting to penetrate in Japanese airspace (trying to act stupid) will have a harder time than an F-35 going into Chinese airspace. The main reason I can think of this is because of the F-35s ability to connect and communicate with other systems and platforms.

[charlielima223]

Wasnt "Chip" Burke the one that accidently spilled the beans on the F35 not getting painted by S300? (RedFlag 17 or 18, memory is failing).

Was a pilot, anyway.

It could've been, he is the most vocal of the F-35s capabilities. Then again its been pretty much echoed by F-22 and F-35 pilots and planners, basically staying undetected in various exercises until the last moment.

Not just staying undetected but just how good the sensors are. F-22 and F-35s have been outsmarting the test and training ranges...

https://breakingdefense.com/2016/11/f-2 ... ges-awacs/

[boogieman]

3. Your not going to have those ground radar tracks in a wartime. GCI will die a painful death.
Anything emmiting will be bombed burned microwaved, Electromagnetic pulsed, or jammed.

In milosh's defence, I think he may have been responding to my concern about ROE prohibiting the destruction of ISR sites in mainland China to avoid nuclear escalation. While F22 and F35 are still well designed to operate in the presence of an intact Chinese IADS network, the inability to systematically dismantle it would definitely make life a lot harder.

A solution to this problem that I have seen raised here in the past is for the U.S and allies to simply sit outside the Chinese A2/AD bubble and impose a naval blockade to economically strangle it. Even this approach is not without its problems though:

When assessing a potential military approach, one must appreciate its strengths, weaknesses, and inherent limits. An oil blockade is not itself a strategy; rather, it is an action appropriately subsumed into a larger economic, diplomatic, and military campaign. It is also an action that in physical, trade-warfare terms would be akin to a nuclear strike on the global economy. An open military conflict between the United States and China would be a globally cataclysmic event on many levels. Furthermore, physically interdicting one of the largest channels in the global oil trade—and with it, major parts of the Chinese economy—very likely would open a Pandora’s box of unforeseen secondary and tertiary adverse consequences whose effects could be worse than even the most pessimistic analyses might suggest.

For this reason, properly understanding the issue and constructing and maintaining an effective and sustainable security architecture designed to prevent such a conflict from ever coming to pass should be core U.S. national security priorities. In this respect, continued advocacy on behalf of a blockade-centric approach (i.e., offshore control) risks undermining U.S. strategic credibility in East Asia. Favoring a blockade-based deterrence policy goes in exactly the opposite direction by communicating that the U.S. political and military communities lack the will to engage in the intense conflict that may in fact be necessary to repel territorial seizures and other actions aimed at undermining U.S. security guarantees and Washington’s standing in the eyes of its allies and others across Asia. Treating a distant blockade as the centerpiece of Washington’s China-facing military stance also risks warping domestic procurement debates, with potentially grave long-term strategic consequences. If a critical mass of Congress comes to believe that the Navy simply can close off China’s maritime oil arteries, members may become more reluctant to appropriate the hundreds of billions of dollars needed in coming decades to fund the personnel costs and hardware acquisitions needed to support and sustain a robust U.S. forward presence in Asia. History strongly suggests that even if a potential foe appears vulnerable to over-the-horizon pressure on its seaborne commerce, a blockade never should be substituted for war or a campaign strategy. As U.S. policy makers contemplate options for potential conflict with China, they forget this lesson at their peril.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/v ... nwc-review

[weasel1962]

In milosh's defence, I think he may have been responding to my concern about ROE prohibiting the destruction of ISR sites in mainland China to avoid nuclear escalation. While F22 and F35 are still well designed to operate in the presence of an intact Chinese IADS network, the inability to systematically dismantle it would definitely make life a lot harder.

Imposing a no-fly, SAM-free buffer zone even within the A2/AD (esp on just a couple of provinces) wouldn't escalate to nukes.

[boogieman]

In milosh's defence, I think he may have been responding to my concern about ROE prohibiting the destruction of ISR sites in mainland China to avoid nuclear escalation. While F22 and F35 are still well designed to operate in the presence of an intact Chinese IADS network, the inability to systematically dismantle it would definitely make life a lot harder.

Imposing a no-fly, SAM-free buffer zone even within the A2/AD (esp on just a couple of provinces) wouldn't escalate to nukes.

No and I'm not saying that it would. Just that the CCP may very well consider their home turf sacred ground and threaten to go for the nuke option if and when we started dismantling OTH-B, mainland JY-27, HQ-9/19, DF-XX Brigades etc etc. Whether we would or should believe that threat is a matter I leave to the experts.

[weasel1962]

China can also threaten nuclear destruction if one calls Xi a pooh-bear (threatening nuke destruction is something Kim does regularly) but that's unlikely to materialize. What is clear is that no fly zones have legal basis in international law.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/v ... ontext=ils

Not saying that one shouldn't tread lightly with a nuclear power but I can certainly see US building up a case for enforcing a no fly zone. TEZ or total exclusion zone is the naval equivalent (which was imposed on Falklands 1982). Not exactly a new tactic and definitely an option.

imho, building up a strong case for its legality in peacetime (and getting consensus early) in itself acts as a deterrent against misadventure because it ups the risks/costs to the aggressor (they can lose control over sovereign airspace and they can lose it for a long time thereafter). Effectively a counter access denial.

And if it fails as a deterrent, what it does do is to delimit/predefine the combat zone. That should the risk of escalation.