F-15X: USAF Seems Interested

That "Less is More" document really puts it into perspective.

Should be distributed on Capitol Hill...

As long as that logic isn't used to say "well do you need 1,763 F-35s, since they can do more with less..."

That "Less is More" document really puts it into perspective.

Should be distributed on Capitol Hill...

As long as that logic isn't used to say "well do you need 1,763 F-35s, since they can do more with less..."

"That's why we don't need 3,000 F-16s, 1,500 Hornets, 400 Harriers. . . "

It might be a worthy search (yet again...) for some to understand how procurement objectives are calculated.

It might be a worthy search (yet again...) for some to understand how procurement objectives are calculated.

How reliable are they? I remember when 750 F-22s were needed. Then 442, 340-ish, 240-ish, and then what we got. On the other hand I also recall a time when they were going to buy 650 F-16s, then 1300, etc.

USAF and all the services have figured out (or should have, by now) that you always ask for more than you really need. Most big ticket weapons systems will be procured in fewer numbers than asked for, with few exceptions. The F-16 was one of them, and probably the best example.

So let's look at the B-21. If the operational requirement/need is really 100 airframes, they better ask for 200. How many B-2's were said to have been necessary? Something tells me it was more than 20. As much as USAF says it needs the F-35, I think they need sufficient numbers of B-21's even moreso. It's the only aircraft that will have 1.) The range 2.) The stealth/survivability 3.) The payload and 4.) In the numbers to take the fight to China and/or near peer threat in the Pacific.

We have not been at war or even been contested in the Pacific since WWII. It took the B-29's phenomenal range to really take it to Japan, and that was only AFTER taking islands closer to Japan to launch from. Yes, it's a different world today with air to air refueling, standoff weapons etc. BUT.... the former is no longer guaranteed, and the latter is awful spendy.

I say we ask for 500 B-21's

It might be a worthy search (yet again...) for some to understand how procurement objectives are calculated.

How reliable are they? I remember when 750 F-22s were needed. Then 442, 340-ish, 240-ish, and then what we got. On the other hand I also recall a time when they were going to buy 650 F-16s, then 1300, etc.

‘Reliability‘ isn’t the issue; for acquisition/budget planning, a baseline reference Is. Most around here don’t know the square root of s__t about where those baselines come from.

I remember when 750 F-22s were needed. Then 442, 340-ish, 240-ish, and then what we got. On the other hand I also recall a time when they were going to buy 650 F-16s, then 1300, etc.

The lack of an adequate numerical force of F-22s is the reason why we are in this dumb pickle in the first place. The USAF doesnt want a repeat of the F-22 with the F-35.

I remember when 750 F-22s were needed. Then 442, 340-ish, 240-ish, and then what we got. On the other hand I also recall a time when they were going to buy 650 F-16s, then 1300, etc.

The lack of an adequate numerical force of F-22s is the reason why we are in this dumb pickle in the first place. The USAF doesnt want a repeat of the F-22 with the F-35.

There's no evidence that F-22 quantities had any impact on the CAPE study. The entire premise was that
fourth gen is a sweet-spot in capability and O&S enabling you to keep the fifth gen force for a rainy day.

The argument was one of even if you had the 300+ F-22s or pick-your-number you wouldn't want to use
them for CONUS CMD or air policing or the wilder TBG standoff assets.

if CONUS protection was the truly valid reason for maintaining high F-15 numbers then continue on withe the cancelled SLEP the F-15C/D. Golden Eagles were formidable and more affordable over 20 years than F-15EX.

It might be a worthy search (yet again...) for some to understand how procurement objectives are calculated.

How reliable are they? I remember when 750 F-22s were needed. Then 442, 340-ish, 240-ish, and then what we got. On the other hand I also recall a time when they were going to buy 650 F-16s, then 1300, etc.

‘Reliability‘ isn’t the issue; for acquisition/budget planning, a baseline reference Is.

Er, maybe we're talking about different things but how can anybody budget plan when quantity is bouncing all over the place? The vendor you're trying to buy from certainly doesn't care what the number was at one point in time if it's changed three times since. (And the price will reflect that.)

if CONUS protection was the truly valid reason for maintaining high F-15 numbers then continue on withe the cancelled SLEP the F-15C/D. Golden Eagles were formidable and more affordable over 20 years than F-15EX.

You're right, has to be a lot more than CONUS defense. Although SLEPing the F-15C never seemed like it would work, at least given more than CONUS responsibilities. For example, the F-15C unit near me is responsible for CONUS of the entire Northeast cooridor. Yet, they regularly deploy at least some of their jets to the far east, middle east etc., mixing it up with Malaysian Flankers among others in the past.

So they must be looking at the F-15EX as a true air dominance platform. Granted, maybe not the first day of war but probably not far behind. The other thing is... many of these units, all they do is air to air. A few of them are tip of the spear too. That sole focus on air to air goes a long way toward the ability to fly, fight and win given the narrow mission profile.

I really admire these men. We hand them 50 year old aircraft, and they find a way to win. Every time. I only wish we had the foresight to give them the F-22 or a dedicated F-35 air superiority variant.

They deserve at least that much...

“Er, maybe we're talking about different things but how can anybody budget plan when quantity is bouncing all over the place?“

We’re actually close to the same thought. My point is that there is a method used to define the baseline numbers for any given program; many around here are unfamiliar with how that happens. Similarly, when someone wants to change those numbers, there is also a formal process for doing so in order to minimize the disruption that an altered procurement objective can have on a program, witness F-22 (...and others, as you suggest).

if CONUS protection was the truly valid reason for maintaining high F-15 numbers then continue on withe the cancelled SLEP the F-15C/D. Golden Eagles were formidable and more affordable over 20 years than F-15EX.

You're right, has to be a lot more than CONUS defense. Although SLEPing the F-15C never seemed like it would work, at least given more than CONUS responsibilities. For example, the F-15C unit near me is responsible for CONUS of the entire Northeast cooridor. Yet, they regularly deploy at least some of their jets to the far east, middle east etc., mixing it up with Malaysian Flankers among others in the past.

The SLEP was the original plan but Mattis' era readiness goals upended that. You couldn't maintain
high readiness or capacity with the F-15s undergoing the SLEP. And Holmes expressed concern
about unknown-unknowns once they started tearing down the F-15 similar to what happened with
the Super Hornet.

So they must be looking at the F-15EX as a true air dominance platform.

They aren't since EPAWSS was only designed with a 2025 threat in mind. They say maybe they can
squeeze that to 2028.

And there's no hint in the CAPE study (or the digests about the CAPE study since the useless journalists out
there haven't gotten their hands on it) of air superiority being a driver.

if CONUS protection was the truly valid reason for maintaining high F-15 numbers then continue on withe the cancelled SLEP the F-15C/D. Golden Eagles were formidable and more affordable over 20 years than F-15EX.

You're right, has to be a lot more than CONUS defense. Although SLEPing the F-15C never seemed like it would work, at least given more than CONUS responsibilities. For example, the F-15C unit near me is responsible for CONUS of the entire Northeast cooridor. Yet, they regularly deploy at least some of their jets to the far east, middle east etc., mixing it up with Malaysian Flankers among others in the past.

So they must be looking at the F-15EX as a true air dominance platform. Granted, maybe not the first day of war but probably not far behind. The other thing is... many of these units, all they do is air to air. A few of them are tip of the spear too. That sole focus on air to air goes a long way toward the ability to fly, fight and win given the narrow mission profile.

I really admire these men. We hand them 50 year old aircraft, and they find a way to win. Every time. I only wish we had the foresight to give them the F-22 or a dedicated F-35 air superiority variant.

They deserve at least that much...

The F-15EX is not being acquired as a Air Dominance Platform. It is in fact a Multi-Role Strike Fighter. Which, will be used in a number of roles. Including the Air Defense Role for the ANG. So, don't expect to see even the ANG Units being dedicated purely in an Air Defense Mission.

Of course assuming the F-15EX isn't canceled. Which, at this stage is very much in question....

The new US Air Force chief has a reputation of only asking for what he needs. He’s going to need a lot.


QUOTE:


The service can no longer count on the money necessary to grow the Air Force, Brown wrote in “Accelerate Change or Lose,” an Aug. 31 paper where he outlined his strategy for the service. To win in a future war with Russia and China, the service must shed legacy missions and equipment, and cancel programs that will not help the Air Force counter future threats.


“Likely future budget pressures will require the most difficult force structure decisions in generations. We cannot shy away from these decisions,” Brown wrote, adding that previous decisions "do not deliver the outcomes we need today due to the rapidly-changing elements of the competitions with China and Russia.”


A future war against a near-peer nation won’t be like the wars of the past two decades, Brown warned. “Future warfare will not remain far from our shores,” he wrote, and the service “must be prepared to fight through combat attrition rates and risks to the Nation that are more akin to the World War II era.”


Brown is expected to detail his marching orders to the service Sept. 14. Should the Air Force move too slowly, it will eventually risk mission failure and loss of life, he wrote.


In short: The Air Force must make changes, and quickly, if it stands a chance of winning.


https://www.defensenews.com/digital-sho ... eed-a-lot/