
wrightwing wrote:allesmorobranna wrote:It is just a matter of time how the false glory of the F-15EX elliminating. This false glory was obvious since the beginning, as the F-15EX was nothing else, but an exact copy of the F-15QA from the almost done manufacturing line in St.Louis.
Boeing would not like to give up and close this line, so they just offer, what they already had in 2018. To provide the "cost effective" solution, they did not touch the design, but offered as a completely customized USAF-related brand new technology.
The "new" F110GE129 engines are 30 years old, new in the USAF inventory, but only for the Eagle community. The USAF was the first oprator of this GE129 engines in their good old F-16C block 50.
Everything around this F-15EX is about the fancy marketing bullshit. Mach 2.5 capability. Yes, it was the design limit of the Eagle back in the late 60's, early 70's, for a clean F-15A, but not available for a twin seater strike variant with CFTs and pylons, weapons, etc.
Hypersonic missile capability, Loyal Wingman capability, latest and greates mission computer, twin seater. For who? The ANG? They are still suffering the pilot shortage, while their main goal is the homeland air defence. So how relevant a hypersonic missile for them?
The USAF would like to purchased a single seater F-15CX, even this kind of modification was not so "cost effective" since McDD closed the single seater manufacturing line back in 1987. It would be good for the USAF, but not comfortable for the manufacturer.
The F-15EX story is a typical example of the post 2000 military-industrial complex attitude: the military will purchase, what the industry will offer them, the main driver is what the industrial complex could provide for the highest profit.
For example, if the USAF is looking for a drone, because it is just 5 million dollar, so it is cheaper than a 50 million jet, the industry will add the features more and more, until the price will reach the 50 million.
Nowadays, the needed capabilies is coming from what the manufacturer suggest to order, than what the military really requires.
Money talks.
Which $5 million drones have turned into $50 million?
As for the F-15EX, we can debate the merits of the USAF buying them, but the notion that an F-15CX could've been built faster and cheaper is simply ridiculous. Defense contractors aren't just building gee whiz items, with the hopes that the military buys them. We wouldn't have bought any new F-15s if that were the case.
That drone-thing was just an example, how the american military-industrial complex is doing the pricing.
The re-start of the single seater fuselage manufacturing would not be a rocket science, especially, if the former proposal in the late-80's/early 90's for the F-15F was actually a single seater version. And the func fact, it had a twin seater canopy!
Nowadays defence contractors are deeply embeded into the Pentagon by their own officiers. These officiers have their precious promises from the contractors for after the military service, so they are working for that money.
Their job is simple, generating demands, but regaring to the offers. And the cheapest offer is always what the Industry already has. But who said that it must be cheap after all? The highest profit is always between the lowest cost and the highest price.
The former world champion was the late McDonnell Douglas (which is actually still acting under the name of Boeing), but the Lockheed Martin also a good candidate for the gold medal.
This lobby system is built up for the fluently arranged demands and offers relationship.
This is how the Pentagon's demand is always what the Industry suggest to.
The Boeing would not like to close the F-15 manufactruing line after the F-15QA. So they start a heavy lobby work to save it by a fancy, but causeless domestic order. Even, if the USAF did not looking for a new 4th gen fighter. It was clear back then. While suddenly, in the Pentagon, lot of military analysists and officiers came up with the importance of the ordering of the F-15EX. That whas suspicious, how the USAF pushed the whole concept to the ANG. This shows really, how welcomed was the EX-deal really.
The one and only reasonable 4th gen remained in the USAF inventory, the F-16. The last valid F-15 order was back in 2000-2001.
The story is simple. The Super Horner is struggling, the block III is still not secured yet, in 2018, the B737MAX had several issues, the B777-9 also, there was no any further order in the horizon after the F-15QA.
The only chance to keep the Boeing Co above the surface, if they force the Pentagon to order something expensive. Anything. The EX-deal is this. Not needed, but enough expensive to save the firm in the stock exchange world.
And the rest is the marketing bullshit about the "cost-effective" solution.
Same old stories: KC-46 Pegasus, the ridicuolus CH-53K "upgrade", where a modernization program took more money than a new one, while the first prototypes had those issues, what were completly unacceptable in the modern, digitalized design environment. To save the T408 program, GE offered the unwanted 7500 HP engines to the Chinook block III program. The airframe and the drivetrain could not handle it. Don't worry! Just a quick study and the T408 become the most perfect solution to the hot&high requirements. While the dedicated ACRB program for the CH-47F block III was unable done the flight tests without crazy resonance issues. Let me ask: where was the extended flow and infinite element R&D before they realized that the actually built in blades have unacceptable resonance attitude?
What was the main driver behind the ACRB program or the T408 integration? Was the Pentagon eager to ordering these things, or just the Industry pushing the Pentagon to support these latest and greatest technologies and developments?
So the F-15EX is not based on a valid customer demand, it is a typical manufacturer pushing.