

OCCURRENCE REPORT: 66998

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FSIS 66998 28 JUN 1979 AIR ACCIDENT

Status: supplemental sent

Unclassified

1. Injury Level: No Injury
2. Aircraft/Operated By: CC130316
3. Aircraft Ownership: 435 SQN / 17 WING / 3435 /
4. A. Location: - LAPES EXTRACTION ZONE NAMAQ -
Latitude: N53-40
Longitude: W113-28
4. B. Date/Time: 281400Z JUN 1979
4. C. Phase of Flight: IN-FLIGHT - LOW LEVEL (BELOW 1000 FT), HOVERING, DIP, WET HOIST
5. Damage Level: Serious - Major component / 3rd line maint
7. Mission Type: MAINTENANCE TEST FLIGHT
- 8. Description:** THE MISSION REQUIRED THAT A FUNCTIONAL CHECK BE DONE ON THE TOW PLATE PRIOR TO AN ACTUAL DROP.
13. Flight/Ground Conditions: CONTACT - VISUAL FLIGHT VFR/VMC (GROUND REFERENCES)
14. Light/Weather Conditions: BRIGHT DAY, GOOD VFR
15. Alighting Conditions: PREPARED (UNPAVED)
22. A. Investigation: DURING THE APPROACH TO THE EXTRACTION ZONE, WITH THE DROGUE FULLY DEPLOYED, THE FLIGHT PROFILE WAS NORMAL AND ALL AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS WERE OPERATING NORMALLY. ON FLARING OVER THE EXTRACTION ZONE, THE AIRCRAFT INADVERTENTLY TOUCHED DOWN CAUSING DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT RAMP. A GO-AROUND WAS CARRIED OUT AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. AFTER LANDING, EXTENSIVE DAMAGE WAS FOUND ON THE AIRCRAFT RAMP AND REAR FUSELAGE OF THE AIRCRAFT.
23. Cause Factors: PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT/UNIT INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION THE PREVENTIVE MEASURES, RECOMMENDED AS A RESULT OF PREVIOUS INCIDENTS, WERE NOT INCORPORATED AS LAPES/TAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE BY THE UNIT.
PERSONNEL PILOT (32A) INFORMATION/COMMUNICATION THE INSTRUCTOR DID NOT CONDUCT A PRE-FLIGHT BRIEFING SUCH THAT THE TWO PILOTS WERE FULLY COGNIZANT OF EACH OTHER'S RESPONSIBILITIES AND SUCH THAT THE PILOT IN THE LEFT SEAT WAS AWARE OF THE LAPES PROFILE REQUIRED.
PERSONNEL PILOT (32A) INATTENTION WHILE COMPLETING THE RIGHT SEAT DUTIES, THE INSTRUCTOR PILOT ALLOWED THE PILOT IN THE LEFT SEAT TO DESCEND BELOW A SAFE FLARE ALTITUDE.
PERSONNEL PILOT (32A) JUDGEMENT THE INSTRUCTOR, REALIZING THAT THE FINAL DESCENT WAS STEEPER THAN NORMAL, ALLOWED THE FIRST OFFICER TO CONTINUE UNCHECKED.