sferrin wrote:quicksilver wrote:I think the ‘Century Series’ is a potentially fatal misreading of history; a romantic but dangerous, revisionist reading of the times. Which design proved to be prescient relative to the eventual need? How much did it all cost and for what end(s)? Back in the day, the US was spending ~8% of GDP on defense; where are we today? Three (3)??
How does a comprehensive test program work for each type, including timelines for component qualification and structural durability? Who gets to sign off on the assumed risk to air worthiness inherent in abbreviated testing in an age where every pimple in the paint job gets reported as a fatal flaw? Is there some kind of hidden repository of leaders willing to sign up to this kind public scrutiny on behalf of the institution?
How do you keep a significant portion of your fighter force (that includes the maintainers not just pilots) in a near perpetual state of transition from one type to another, while meeting operational commitments?
Just for starters...
The 40s-50s would have probably scared the hell out of you by comparison. Roper's point is that it's almost to the point that by the time a thing is fielded it's obsolete. Even "back in the day" things were changing so fast that was a danger. Compare the F-100 to the YF-12A. 10 years apart. Less than the time it took to go from the X-35 to the F-35.
I flew the AV-8A for several years. Few things scare me...
I get it. They wanna go faster and (for the sake of learning) profess a willingness to accept the risk that comes as a consequence. Engineers know how to do that; bureaucrats/politicians do not. When we start talking MDAPs (instead of what amounts to small science projects), there are some things that 'going faster' programmatically does not resolve -- like keeping the training systems aligned with the systems and capabilities in the aircraft, and shortening the timelines necessary to bring humans (whether they be pilots or maintainers) up to speed in those systems -- all in the context of fielding combat-ready, deployable units. There's no Cold War and there is no major air war going on the other side of the planet (yet). Thus, if there is any compelling need, it is certainly less evident to the average tax-paying/voting American.
Of course there are the two large elephants standing in the corner -- money and the ubiquity of public information sources about what's being built, why and at what expense. Together they drive limitations on the art of the possible wrt the pursuit of any 'shiney new thing' and the amount of risk acceptance that the government tacitly asks the public to accept. Much different than the 40s, 50s or 60s...