A more lengthy and technically detailed FOI analysis volume, regarding Russian A2/D2 within the European/Baltic context, released this week.
Abstract
States with the ability to use a combination of sensors and long-range missiles to prevent adversaries from operating and thus creating an exclusion zone, are said to possess anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This collection of essays uses our previous FOI report on Russian A2/AD capabilities (Bursting the Bubble) as a point of departure. Ten experts analyse five themes: Russian A2/AD capabilities today and in the future; options for counter-A2/AD operations in Europe; concepts for defending or reconquering territory under a hostile A2/AD umbrella; different approaches to managing the long-range precision strike threat; and the impact of A2/AD on the balance of power in Europe. The study does not arrive at any single, overarching conclusion, but there is significant convergence of views amongst a majority of the authors. On the one hand, Russia cannot create impenetrable "bubbles" where NATO forces cannot operate. On the other hand, counter-A2/AD operations are complex, requiring significant assets and capabilities, and carry significant risk of high attrition rates. The critical factors are the assets required, expected attrition rates, the time frames needed - and political will to shoulder costs and risks. A majority of the authors also argue that Russian A2/AD would be at its most troublesome during a short, sharp war, making well-rehearsed countermeasures essential. Compared to Bursting the Bubble, the multi-domain character of counter-A2/AD operations, including i.a. electronic warfare and non-military means, is emphasised, thus deepening the granularity of the analyses. Considerable uncertainty or disagreement remains on topics such as the level of integration within Russian air defences, the impact of stealth, and electronic warfare.
Introduction
On March 4, 2019, FOI published the report, Bursting the Bubble – Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications.1 Initiated almost two years earlier, the study had originally been intended as a brief open-sourced primer for non-specialists, explaining why security analysts should not accept inflated claims regarding Russia’s ability to create impenetrable antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) “bubbles” – often represented on maps by large red circles – using long-range sensors and missiles. As work progressed, however, we found it increasingly necessary to drive home why this was the case, so the study continuously expanded in volume, especially towards explaining the technical limitations of the main systems, the wide array of possible countermeasures available, and the strategic considerations, which together limit Russia’s ability to impose large “no-go zones.” Conversely, Russia has strong incentives – political as well as economic – for creating exactly this impression, which is why claims about the maximal capabilities of its main systems (such as the long-range airdefence system S-400) should be taken with a healthy dose of scepticism, rather than simply accepted at face-value.2
While neither of us are rocket scientists, electronics engineers, nor Russian area specialists, our work benefited greatly from the fact that FOI has in-house topnotch specialists in these fields who could aid and augment our analysis. Moreover, parallel studies – relying on complementary sources – of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities further reinforced several of the findings from our open-source analysis.
Published at an opportune time, Bursting the Bubble quickly garnered an inordinate amount of attention, at least by the standards of an FOI publication. The report became by far the most widely downloaded FOI publication in 2019; it was cited and debated in numerous specialist and non-specialist publications and attracted attention from practitioners and policymakers alike.3 Perhaps most encouragingly, the report seemed to break the spell surrounding Russian A2/AD capabilities, as even the harshest critics of the study accepted its basic arguments: that Russia cannot create impenetrable bubbles; that the maximum nominal range of its systems should not be confused with their substantially shorter effective range; and that much of the public debate on the topic had up to that point been simplistic to a fault.
That being said, in spite of the wide scope of Bursting the Bubble, we were always cognisant that it was by no means the last word on Russian A2/AD capabilities.4 Firstly, the study primarily analysed the main Russian systems (the aforementioned S-400, the sea-target missile Bastion P, and the Iskander-M ballistic missile) in depth. While the report certainly mentioned and considered a number of capabilities – the wide array of complementary shorter-range land-based systems, the long-range cruise missiles, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), and the support functions – the additional capability they provide and the complex “system versus system” aspect of a counter-A2/AD campaign was not explored in full depth.5 Secondly, additional factors that go beyond the three traditional domains of warfare, again, although mentioned and considered, were not explored in full detail. These factors include the non-military means of A2/AD, cyber, and electronic warfare (EW), as well as Russian doctrine and historical experiences from the suppression of other enemy air defence (SEAD) campaigns than those mentioned in the study. This omission was not an oversight, but simply reflected a decision to eat the elephant one bite at a time. Already as it was, the project stretched time, energy, and financial resources to the limit. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we were aware of the risk of being misinterpreted, moving the public debate in apendulum swing from one of exaggerated fears towards one of equally unwarranted dismissiveness. Dismissing Russia’s A2/AD capabilities was never the objective nor the argument of the study, a qualification clearly and repeatedly emphasised,6 but some nonetheless managed to read such conclusions into its findings.7
Purpose and Organization of the Report
Continuing the analysis where Bursting the Bubble left off is the aim of this edited volume. Published as a report, it represents the proceedings of a conference organised by FOI and held in Stockholm, December 5–6, 2019. The purpose of the meeting was threefold: firstly, to expose our study and its findings to critical scrutiny from a wide spectrum of experts; secondly, to identify areas of common ground amongst leading researchers and practitioners; and, thirdly, to map out the areas of remaining disagreement or uncertainty for future research. The workshop was organised into five panels, covering topics that we had already deemed as needing further analysis, with two panellists to discuss each topic:
• Status and Future of Russian A2/AD Systems and Capabilities. Justin Bronk (RUSI) and Douglas Barrie (IISS).
• Options for Counter-A2/AD SEAD in Europe: Tactics, Techniques, and Necessary Assets. Jamie Meighan (RAF, Maxwell AFB); Karl Mueller (RAND).
• Concepts for Defending or Reconquering Territory under a Hostile A2/AD Umbrella. Anders Puck Nielsen (Danish Defence College); Ilmars Lejins (Latvian Army).
• Different Approaches to Managing the Long-Range Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. Robin Häggblom (FI); Luis Simon (Vrije Universiteit Brussel).
• Impact of A2/AD on the Emerging Balance of Power in Northern Europe? Ben Hodges (CEPA); Keir Giles (Chatham House).
The conference was attended by invitation only and held under the Chatham House Rule. As such, the chapters in these proceedings are based on papers that the speakers submitted ahead of the conference and finalised afterwards, rather than on primarily or directly what was said during the conference itself.
12 Mar 2019, 12:24
