How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 04:51
by jessmo112
To be more specific, how does China achieve a firing solution for this thing?

There has been alot of noise about this system lately.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/worl ... a-sea.html

Im trying to figure out in my head a few things:

1. How far does a carrier travel in the 10-15 minutes it takes for the Chinese missile to move from the Chinese interior to the SCS?

2. This means you have atleast 10 -15 minutes to disrupt the kill chain, which is an eternity in military engagement time.

3. Is the targeting by sat?
Do they think we cant jamm or fire on a sat in 10 minutes? Are they going to use a sub?
Can the sub paint a carrier for that long?
Anything in the EM spectrum will be
Tracked and killed within this time?
Will they paint the ship with a laser?

4. Even if you give the missile the biggest seeker imaginable you need almost real time updates to track the moving ship. There are numerous problems with a large X-band antenna seeing over the horizon or aquiring the right ship.

5. Even if they used an electro optical space system. This will be killed via aegis, and In not sure it can trasmit data fast enough for a real track.

Im coming to the conclusion that this weapon is a paper tiger or paper dragon rather.
Im not even sure they can accurately find the strike group let alone paint it for ten minutes.
After you find it and paint it, not you have to maintain a weapons quality track on a target thats both shooting, maneuvering, and spoofing.

Discuss.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 06:24
by boogieman
The supporting ISR apparatus strikes me as being the achilles heel of the PRC ASBM capability. As you said, all of the proposed targeting data providers seem reasonably vulnerable. Yaogan et al could theoretically be killed via SM3, OTH-B et al. are large, static arrays that could be dismantled via LACM etc, and their overwhelmingly diesel sub fleet is not likely to keep up with CSGs operating in deeper water. That leaves conventional aircraft that would need to survive CSG BARCAP/intercept for long enough to complete the kill chain...

The only caveats I can see to this is that RoE may prohibit kinetic attacks on mainland OTHR and LEO ISR sats (Kessler syndrome?), in which case you may have to jam the latter and live with the more limited range (and possibly resolution?) of the former. There is also the Sharp Sword LO UAV and WZ-8 hyper UAS to contend with but I am honestly not sure how effective either would be as "ASBM spotters".

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 07:29
by jessmo112
boogieman wrote:The supporting ISR apparatus strikes me as being the achilles heel of the PRC ASBM capability. As you said, all of the proposed targeting data providers seem reasonably vulnerable. Yaogan et al could theoretically be killed via SM3, OTH-B et al. are large, static arrays that could be dismantled via LACM etc, and their overwhelmingly diesel sub fleet is not likely to keep up with CSGs operating in deeper water. That leaves conventional aircraft that would need to survive CSG BARCAP/intercept for long enough to complete the kill chain...

The only caveats I can see to this is that RoE may prohibit kinetic attacks on mainland OTHR and LEO ISR sats (Kessler syndrome?), in which case you may have to jam the latter and live with the more limited range (and possibly resolution?) of the former. There is also the Sharp Sword LO UAV and WZ-8 hyper UAS to contend with but I am honestly not sure how effective either would be as "ASBM spotters".


Like I said before I know my calculations arnt correct, but we are assuming that this IRBM will have a flight time of 10-15 minutes.
That is an eternity to an Aegis cruiser.
Even if you tried to attack our satellites F-35s might see it from 800 miles away.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 07:36
by jessmo112
https://youtu.be/qF29GBSpRF4

F-35 tracking missile launchea.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 09:18
by boogieman
Well I am far from an authority on the subject but the PRC do have their own ASAT capability in HQ-19, Dong Neng etc. I imagine you'd be relying on LEO sats like SBIRS to detect the actual launch signatures of the ASBMs, then it would be over to ground/ship based BMD radars for the rest of the flight. How long something like SBIRS would last over Chinese territory when the balloon went up I don't know - my gut says it would not be safe to expect to know about the launches from the moment they left the ground. F35s could help here but it also depends on the location of the launch site(s) - DF-26 could be kept pretty deep in the Chinese hinterland (where there wouldn't be many F35s) and still reach the SCS.

That said I do wonder how viable the ASBM arsenal would be if you jam/destroy any ISR sats that pass over your naval groups, hit OTHR sites with CHAMP and screen against Sharp Sword & Soar Dragon with the usual CSG defence-in-depth. WZ-8 has me scratching my head as I'm not totally sure if it has a role here. Its speed and altitude would seem to make it tough to kill but I'm not sure if it would have the on-station persistence needed to cue an ASBM volley.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 09:23
by hornetfinn
The kill-chain is defintely difficult to make reliable and effective for such a weapon. I think one possibility is that those ballistic missiles are not really meant to engage fastly moving targets. Maybe their idea is to mostly use them when ships are stationary or moving slowly. Like ships in port or otherwise rendered immobile for some time. It would still require dedicated naval missile to be able to reliably engage certain vessels in a port with a lot of ships close to each other.

Of course the likely present credible threat to moving ships which might complicate naval operations and force them further away.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 10:41
by jessmo112
The missiles on the interior really are not that safe.
A B-21 or an armed RQ-170 could definitely reach them.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 11:29
by hornetfinn
One point is that USN is definitely not the only navy whose ships may be targeted. There are Indian, Japanese, South Korean, and even Russian navies right next door to China for example. None of those have the capabilities of USA but they do have pretty fair number of advanced ships with good capabilties to deal with regular anti-ship missiles.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 11:39
by jessmo112
hornetfinn wrote:One point is that USN is definitely not the only navy whose ships may be targeted. There are Indian, Japanese, South Korean, and even Russian navies right next door to China for example. None of those have the capabilities of USA but they do have pretty fair number of advanced ships with good capabilties to deal with regular anti-ship missiles.


Thats another big issue. Identifying friend and foe.
With no 3rd party targeting the missile might track a chinese warship. Or even worse a oil tanker or cargo ship. I bet the Chinese were stupid enough to use war time trscking in the latest test. Showing every link in the kill chain. Thats why they are pissed at American signet planes flying close by.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 18:22
by milosh
jessmo112 wrote:https://youtu.be/qF29GBSpRF4

F-35 tracking missile launchea.


Not even close comparison.

Chinese IRBM design to engage CAG are lot lighter around 20tons or less depend on model, while rocket on video is Falcon 9 space rocket with couple magnitudes bigger IR signature.

Burn time of irbm is lot shorter then F9, and second stage probable have just thrusters to correct trajectory. So no heat signature of second stage either.

Second state is where things became very problematic. It is small,it is warhead with some electronics and thrusters and RCS of such target even without RAM is very small:
https://media.thebulletin.org/wp-conten ... Postol.pdf

Add RAM and you have target which very hard to detect (VLO or even lower RCS).

So best option against Chinese carrier killers is to kill kill chain. Which is probable doable right now but China isn't plan to sit and don't do nothing. Just look how their destroyer fleet is growing:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboo ... %20leaders.

Same story with other equipment so we can expect they will have fleet of long range stealthy drone AEWs:
https://www.popsci.com/resizer/JeV3RXoM ... GPFAFQ.jpg

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 28 Aug 2020, 20:18
by zhangmdev
Smaller rockets doesn't burn at cooler temperatures. Solid rocket booster exhaust is hotter than liquid rocket engine's.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 29 Aug 2020, 00:13
by jessmo112
milosh wrote:
jessmo112 wrote:https://youtu.be/qF29GBSpRF4

F-35 tracking missile launchea.


Not even close comparison.

Chinese IRBM design to engage CAG are lot lighter around 20tons or less depend on model, while rocket on video is Falcon 9 space rocket with couple magnitudes bigger IR signature.

Burn time of irbm is lot shorter then F9, and second stage probable have just thrusters to correct trajectory. So no heat signature of second stage either.

Second state is where things became very problematic. It is small,it is warhead with some electronics and thrusters and RCS of such target even without RAM is very small:
https://media.thebulletin.org/wp-conten ... Postol.pdf

Add RAM and you have target which very hard to detect (VLO or even lower RCS).

So best option against Chinese carrier killers is to kill kill chain. Which is probable doable right now but China isn't plan to sit and don't do nothing. Just look how their destroyer fleet is growing:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboo ... %20leaders.

Same story with other equipment so we can expect they will have fleet of long range stealthy drone AEWs:
https://www.popsci.com/resizer/JeV3RXoM ... GPFAFQ.jpg


The F-35s sendors are sensitive enough to detect artillery fire. A rocket shouldn't be an issue.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 29 Aug 2020, 02:43
by boogieman
milosh wrote:
jessmo112 wrote:https://youtu.be/qF29GBSpRF4

F-35 tracking missile launchea.


Not even close comparison.

Chinese IRBM design to engage CAG are lot lighter around 20tons or less depend on model, while rocket on video is Falcon 9 space rocket with couple magnitudes bigger IR signature.

Burn time of irbm is lot shorter then F9, and second stage probable have just thrusters to correct trajectory. So no heat signature of second stage either.

Second state is where things became very problematic. It is small,it is warhead with some electronics and thrusters and RCS of such target even without RAM is very small:
https://media.thebulletin.org/wp-conten ... Postol.pdf

Add RAM and you have target which very hard to detect (VLO or even lower RCS).

So best option against Chinese carrier killers is to kill kill chain. Which is probable doable right now but China isn't plan to sit and don't do nothing. Just look how their destroyer fleet is growing:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboo ... %20leaders.

Same story with other equipment so we can expect they will have fleet of long range stealthy drone AEWs:
https://www.popsci.com/resizer/JeV3RXoM ... GPFAFQ.jpg


Yes I think you are correct in that the kill chain itself is the weak link here - relying on the ability to intercept the ASBMs themselves strikes me as a losing proposition, since VLS cells are limited and ASBM stocks on mainland China are likely to be less so.

As we have touched upon before, SM3 makes the utility of their ISR sats questionable, and while I understand that there may be hesitance to shoot them down due to concerns about Kessler Syndrome, those fears might well take a back seat if the alternative is for USN vessels to be hit with DF26/21D. Certainly jamming would be preferable though.

I am less confident about whether or not their OTHR assets would be able to provide the needed resolution to accurately cue ASBM volleys, but I am sure it is something they are working on. I've heard speculation that ASM cueing is something that our own JORN network might be capable of in future.

In some respects the stealthy UAS capability might be the most compelling data provider. With that said, I am not confident that an AEW-oriented system like Divine Eagle would be well suited to the task. I just don't see how it would mount a sufficiently large and powerful enough radar array to get the job done. Certainly makes sense for detecting F22/35 at closer range, but a CSG? Not to sure. Sharp Sword strikes me as a better fit for attempting to slip through USN BARCAP and (passively?) triangulate the group's location. Perhaps Divine Eagle could do the same - hard, to say. Its sig reduction features look... unorthodox to my untrained eye(?).

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 29 Aug 2020, 04:37
by michaelemouse
Wikipedia gives the DF-21 as having terminal active radar. Through ISR means, you get a general idea of where the target carrier is then launch and let the missile aim for the return it recognizes as a carrier. Spotting doesn't need to be continuous; You can use ISR units to catch peeks of the target to give the missiles updates through the 10 minutes it takes to reach full range. That's subject to a lot of possible errors and most missiles will miss but it seems feasible. Missile attacks sometimes rely on saturation and an attack on a carrier would likely involve many missiles. Any idea how much a DF-12 (or HGVs generally) costs?

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 29 Aug 2020, 07:35
by element1loop
jessmo112 wrote:The missiles on the interior really are not that safe.
A B-21 or an armed RQ-170 could definitely reach them.


Not needed.

A VLO F-35A with VLO JASSM-ER can hit targets anywhere in central China now, from multiple surrounding countries - unrefueled.

See these unrefueled range circles for JASSM-ER and JSM:
viewtopic.php?p=429798#p429798
viewtopic.php?p=429867#p429867
viewtopic.php?p=428144#p428144
viewtopic.php?p=428259#p428259
viewtopic.php?p=428260#p428260

China's best forces and central China in general, are open to rapid continuous multi-axis missile attacks in a way no other major power currently is.

Their 'area denial' is not going to work and it doesn't need a major new investment in a new platform to soundly and ultimately thrash the PLA, PLAAF and PLAN. What it does need is more, and more effective, and more affordable missile defenses, and far more medium and long-range VLO attack missiles, to enable this to occur much more easily, with far fewer losses.

Which is developing now.

[ EDIT: A note to clarify. I'm not suggesting for one second that B-21 and attack drones are not necessary and essential components here, so please don't go interpreting my pointing this out so bluntly in this way. I think they absolutely are essential to minimizing losses and preventing PLA from gaining the initiative or holding on to it. My point is the PLA are going to get hit everywhere, from beginning to end and they would lose, terribly. The PLA and CCP need to understand this. And we need to understand it too so that we build the right things, in the right numbers, with the right integration to win what could turn into a fight they have materially lost but refuse to accept they have already been defeated. The CCP may feel the need to fight on (pointlessly) for years, rather than accept that they were defeated. That's the fight the CCP would probably then want. Plus that we don't imagine that our position is weak or feeble, right now. Every other country likewise needs to understand how this would go, much more clearly. Especially our own media, institutions, leaders and diplomats. We can relatively defang the PLA, but they are likely (IMHO) to double-down on continuing with armed combat, because what is the CCP's alternative? We'd then need a force for that eventuality, and their like-minded partners would be making trouble simultaneously, and likewise refuse to stop for years. What air force, navy, weapons, production capacity and spares do we need then? ]

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 29 Aug 2020, 14:18
by jessmo112
michaelemouse wrote:Wikipedia gives the DF-21 as having terminal active radar. Through ISR means, you get a general idea of where the target carrier is then launch and let the missile aim for the return it recognizes as a carrier. Spotting doesn't need to be continuous; You can use ISR units to catch peeks of the target to give the missiles updates through the 10 minutes it takes to reach full range. That's subject to a lot of possible errors and most missiles will miss but it seems feasible. Missile attacks sometimes rely on saturation and an attack on a carrier would likely involve many missiles. Any idea how much a DF-12 (or HGVs generally) costs?


Thats my point:

1. ISR assests wont last long enough for updates

2. A carrier can move really far in 10-15 minutes. The course corrections might be measured in tens on miles.
30knots = how much distance in 10 minutes? If My napkin math is correct thats > 5miles
Whats the circular radius of 5 miles?

3. The incoming radars can very easily be jammed especially by F-35s Growlers.

4. Lastly the Missile bases and TELS die.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 29 Aug 2020, 22:03
by michaelemouse
jessmo112 wrote:
Thats my point:

1. ISR assests wont last long enough for updates

2. A carrier can move really far in 10-15 minutes. The course corrections might be measured in tens on miles.
30knots = how much distance in 10 minutes? If My napkin math is correct thats > 5miles
Whats the circular radius of 5 miles?

3. The incoming radars can very easily be jammed especially by F-35s Growlers.

4. Lastly the Missile bases and TELS die.



1: You seem quite certain that between satellites, submarines, aircraft, and underwater sonar sensors, the Chinese won't be able to catch a peek (radar, visual, sonar, ELINT) every few minutes. Recon drones (or even manned aircraft) wouldn't have to live long after after spotting the carrier. Still, it's possible none of them could spot the carrier because the carrier group's defenses would be airtight but I don't know enough about that to say.

2: The missiles will have the advantage of altitude to cover a wide area in their initial search. Several missiles abreast going at hypersonic speed could cover a wide area for the terminal search phase.

3: Do some Chinese carrier killers use AESA radar? I thought those were rather resistant to jamming.

4: Missile bases, sure. TELs, I'm curious to know how the US would take them (nearly) all out before they launch.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2020, 00:12
by jessmo112
1. Your probably right, I will concede the point that youll eventually be spotted. Even if its just the destroyer pickets that are targeted ships are not replaced easy.

2. True like I said the real issue will be target identification. And resistance to spoofing.

3. Aesa can be hard to Jam, but F-35 has reportedly scanned and jammed the F-22s radar.
China can barely build its own chip foundries so I doubt they can beat us in the ecm game.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2020, 01:52
by element1loop
michaelemouse wrote:1: You seem quite certain that between satellites, submarines, aircraft, and underwater sonar sensors, the Chinese won't be able to catch a peek (radar, visual, sonar, ELINT) every few minutes.


I think it's an unmerited premise that USN of near future are going to rush to expose carriers early (except for those already close to China, or Japan, which may be hit or lost early, but they do have a comprehensive regional layered air defense network, so certainly not easy to kill) before most threat platforms and sensors in the PLA's kill-chain, including subs, have been substantially attrited, degraded and disrupted.

I also think it's unrealistic to expect China to hold back from trying to kill as many US and allied satellites as possible (including NATO's). They will not permit these to operate. This does not mean kinetic kill, and may not be kinetic, but I expect the PLA will shoot with what they have to get it done. At which point the US certainly reciprocates if not preempts that, and begins to incrementally replace its own satellites with reserve tactical satellite launches. Similar Chinese tactical satellite launches are likely to be detected and classified easily as their sats launch, by forward USMC F-35B working from islands. So those sats would be quickly disposed of too.

ELINT? EMCON would certainly apply, which does not mean no emissions, just no emissions an enemy is going to be in a position to detect (wattage and LOS limited). So that is not a likely source of tracking a carrier. Larger ships (not necessarily combat ships) or islands are capable of acting as passive HF and VHF radar receiver arrays to detect if stealthy aircraft or missiles are present in the area or region (and go kill them and their operating support bases). Which enables EMCON to operate with confidence, as long as PLA satellites are on the blink (preferably non-kinetic) plus Growler can limit the range of signals in the axis towards OPFOR. Which leaves subs being within LOS, with comms antennas up. Not a survivable location or condition for a sub to be in for very long, given this is exactly what the pickets and ASW aircraft and SSNs will be looking for near the carrier.

SOSUS LF type arrays could hear a carrier across an ocean basin, but getting a target fix is not going to happen. Which is a very good reason to deny PLAN deep-water island atoll base access (keep them on the littoral) to make such arrays ineffective (i.e. another reason why a Sea Base X-band radar platform is expensive but very attractive for a range of reasons).

I would say visual and radar LOS are out, plus the comms needed for their kill-chain links. Chinese OTHR will be a priority target that's revisited, as necessary.

Another factor which escapes such considerations is the duration of the conflict, and the resulting effects on tactics and weapons use, and availability as strike options over time. IMO, such a major conventional conflict would start with a strong initial flurry of missiles, and regional air and naval attacks, then enter an unresolved 'phoney war' phase, of real preparation to fight it out, and a build up (maybe of many months) while lower level combat continues (PLAN surface fleet is destroyed and intense ASW gets rolling, plus FARP strikes) and talks about a ceasefire progress. If a ceasefire does not occur, then a much longer slog of securing regional firing position and executing systematic attacks takes place, while the main USN/USMC carrier fleets finally move in with USAF covering, to finish off the usual war-fighting capabilities on the mainland.

That sort of timing and strategic consideration in a longer fight will have a huge impact on carrier tactics, standoff radius, and supporting weapons use and timing their expenditure. This determines when carriers will have to move 500nm closer to get effects. If delaying moving carriers in close, for as long as possible, by having long-range tactical aircraft on deck, bomber support, long-range VLO missiles (which hide where the launch originated from), and a fleet MQ-25, USN have strongly improved the chances of the carriers surviving BMs and ASuW.

There is no need at all to rush carriers into high threat areas against a major power, they can prep their moves with months of preparations to reduce damage or even eliminate losses. The point is to win, not to rush needlessly and screw up.

RE the DDGs or future FFGs getting hit instead, this presumes BMs can get past a multilayered missile defense. They would need a LOT of well targeted BMs to take out those DDGs. Plus forwards F-35B will see boosts, and high-altitude F-35C CAP 700nm toward China from their carrier, would provide mid-course cues and the projected aim/impact point for a fleet to respond to very early, and prep their systems and location for optimal readiness conditions.

IMO the BM menace is a dangerous complication but US and allied fleets would mostly survive them. Which is all that is required. That means China's PLAAF and PLAN platforms sensors and enabling comms won't survive.

Anti-carrier TELs without external target quality data are as useful in a naval battle, as a jammed and degraded SAM network is during an air campaign.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2020, 08:14
by milosh
jessmo112 wrote:
michaelemouse wrote:Wikipedia gives the DF-21 as having terminal active radar. Through ISR means, you get a general idea of where the target carrier is then launch and let the missile aim for the return it recognizes as a carrier. Spotting doesn't need to be continuous; You can use ISR units to catch peeks of the target to give the missiles updates through the 10 minutes it takes to reach full range. That's subject to a lot of possible errors and most missiles will miss but it seems feasible. Missile attacks sometimes rely on saturation and an attack on a carrier would likely involve many missiles. Any idea how much a DF-12 (or HGVs generally) costs?


Thats my point:

1. ISR assests wont last long enough for updates

2. A carrier can move really far in 10-15 minutes. The course corrections might be measured in tens on miles.
30knots = how much distance in 10 minutes? If My napkin math is correct thats > 5miles
Whats the circular radius of 5 miles?

3. The incoming radars can very easily be jammed especially by F-35s Growlers.

4. Lastly the Missile bases and TELS die.


1. Now things are more less like that. But China doesn't plan short term. For example their navy is growing extremely fast.

They have lot of AEW project right now.

Most hyped are rocket or jet power supersonic drones but also lot of subsonic stealthy drones in development. So they will have lot of UAV which can be used to track CAG. Also they probable have hydrophones which can track CAG without problem.

4.IRBM is expensive weapon so if it is easy to be killed on ground, it would be fired from TEL which is design as stealthy vehicle. No one is doing that because it is very hard to locate TEL even after it fired missile as happen in Iraq 1991. That is much easier scenario to kill TELs and still it was very hard, I think only eight TELs where hit during whole war AFTER they fired rockets, beause coaltion conculed they simple can't hunt TELs before that becuase of masking, decoys and hide locations. In Iraq it is also lot harder to hide something becuase it is flat desert land but still they were quite able to hide TELs.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2020, 14:55
by jessmo112
Your last point was one of the reasons for the F-35.
Modern fighters and ISR can track and triagulate a missile launch.

If you havent seen this video check ot out.
Forward positioned F-35s RQ-170s and B-21s
Will trasmit Tel positions long before
The fleet sees the launch.
F-35 also has an advanced radar that can Identify a Missile and TEL in clutter.

https://youtu.be/wIwAOupjMeM

https://youtu.be/e1NrFZddihQ

This isn't 1991. Missile launchers cant hide

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2020, 17:49
by milosh
jessmo112 wrote:This isn't 1991. Missile launchers cant hide


And China isn't Iraq either.

Geography. Iraq is flat with very little vegetation. On other hand this is East China:
Image
Hinding TELs in such environment is lot easier then in case of Iraq.

Also Chinese very likely have modified truck trailers and train wagons as TELs.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 30 Aug 2020, 20:47
by jessmo112
milosh wrote:
jessmo112 wrote:This isn't 1991. Missile launchers cant hide


And China isn't Iraq either.

Geography. Iraq is flat with very little vegetation. On other hand this is East China:
Image
Hinding TELs in such environment is lot easier then in case of Iraq.

Also Chinese very likely have modified truck trailers and train wagons as TELs.


But the trailers cant hide from Aesa radar sar maps.
I told you the plane recognizes targets. If you shoot your even more vulnerable, and are likely to lose the TRL and the missile farm.
We are building assets that are designed to wander the Chinese interior. Ill eat my hat if the B-21 ,doesnt have a DAS like design.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 31 Aug 2020, 02:03
by boogieman
AFAIK the PLARF has a pretty elaborate tunnel network within which to hide and move its TELs.

https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Doc ... 112005-803

I doubt TEL hunting would be very easy over mainland China.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 31 Aug 2020, 02:14
by element1loop
I don't think there's much chance of killing TELS off. Denying them communications and especially destroying sensors they need to operate will be what negates them. The BM equivalent of bypassing the occupied Islands you don't need, and cutting them off from logistical support as per during the advance from PNG to the Marianas during WWII. Once cutoff they're out of the fight, just got to make sure they stay cutoff from targeting data.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 31 Aug 2020, 02:34
by boogieman
Agree - leave them blind, deaf and dumb and the threat evaporates. Pretty much every ISR node they will be relying upon is vulnerable in some way shape or form.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 31 Aug 2020, 02:45
by jessmo112
So If you commanded a RQ-170 squadren would you pass on the opportunity?
F-35s could likely triangulate
The offending missile, use intel and isr assets to find the nearest offending hole, and put a bomb in it.
I agree is easier to Knock out all of the isr enablers.
But a war with China wont end with the Carrier Killer missile assets in tact.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 31 Aug 2020, 03:51
by element1loop
jessmo112 wrote:So If you commanded a RQ-170 squadren would you pass on the opportunity?
F-35s could likely triangulate
The offending missile, use intel and isr assets to find the nearest offending hole, and put a bomb in it.
I agree is easier to Knock out all of the isr enablers.
But a war with China wont end with the Carrier Killer missile assets in tact.


Sure, kill them, if there are no other pressing priorities and the resources to do it are there. I wonder if they can be found and positively IDed though, some will be remote, but many TELs will be in sensor occluding high valleys (where everything else is in much of China). They're not going to be easy to find once deployed. I'd have the big SAMs on mountains and TELS hidden under camo or warehouse roofs in the narrow valleys, full of excess visual noise. PLA can make it extremely hard to find and kill those. The best bet is to require their supervised destruction as apart of a final ceasefire agreement and limitations of such weapons in future. Something they won't do now.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 31 Aug 2020, 15:54
by mixelflick
I agree the USN/other armed services and probably the CIA have most if not all of these "carrier killers" targeted and on the short list for destruction in the opening days of a war. The B-21 will probably be the ultimate (manned) expression of one of these "wanderer" like platforms hunting and killing these things in the Chinese mainland. The problem with all that is twofold..

1.) The Chinese know it, and...
2.) It only takes ONE to get through

Now that more and more will be hypersonic, problems 1 and (especially) 2 become more and more magnified. The Navy will still deploy its carriers, but anyone with a shred of a brian cell knows they won't be anywhere near China/these sites, nor will they be "first day of war" or even first week of war weapons. Submarines however, will.

If the architects of Naval warfare can't see this coming, something is very, very wrong. It's as obvious as the battleship losing its place as "top dog" in WWII. Hell it even has the same reason (greater speed/range of aircraft launched from carriers, greater speed/range of hypersonic missiles launched from.... lots of places).

Every ounce of effort going into making the B-21 a hunter/killer of these things? That same amount of $ and effort needs to be put into submarines, and their corresponding capability insofar as locating and destroying these targets. It will not be an easy or inexpensive endeavor...

But it's the right thing to do IMO

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 31 Aug 2020, 20:42
by jessmo112

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2020, 03:18
by element1loop
jessmo112 wrote:https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.foxnews.com/tech/how-would-the-us-navy-stop-chinese-carrier-killer-anti-ship-missiles.amp


This popped up last week. USAF development for maneuvering 'gliding' BMs occurred during the mid-1960s, and was well developed by the late 1970s. Everyone's played catch-up since. But they pretend it's new and that Russia did it first.

PDF Report from Aerospace Corp (Aug 26, 2020) The Missile Threat: A Taxonomy for Moving Beyond Ballistic

https://aerospace.org/sites/default/fil ... 0826_0.pdf

Summary

“U.S. approaches to missile warning and missile defense remain predicated on the idea that most adversarial missiles will follow parabolic ballistic trajectories to predictable targets. That no longer adequately describes the threat. Based on a survey of missile systems from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, most potential adversarial missiles have maneuvering capabilities that distinguish them from ballistic missiles. Yet, because more appropriate constructs for classifying missiles do not exist, U.S. guidance mischaracterizes many of these systems as ballistic. If we mislabel missiles because we are using outdated heuristics, we may find ourselves surprised and ill-equipped to confront current and anticipated threats. Our current constructs tend to treat maneuverability as a binary—e.g., hypersonic glide vehicles are maneuverable and ballistic missiles are not. But, in fact, there is a spectrum of maneuverability, which creates the need for more nuanced distinctions. A more comprehensive taxonomy for capturing the threat, as presented in this paper, could affect decisions for missile warning, missile defense, and broader strategic policy.


The current USN multilayered defense was designed to respond to maneuvering tactical conventional BMs. And the new rash of concern is an evolution of a long preexisting threat and nothing fundamentally new. 'Hypersonic gliders' are not a new threat, I read about these many times in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They're perhaps new within opposing force conventional RVs now though. USN DDG quality and numbers, plus their sensors, SAM quality (and numbers) are all at a new level compared to when maneuvering RVs became a viable weapon during the cold war. Only now these have become a conventional attack threat for ships as well. I would say that from the beginning denying targeting data has been the best way to make precision conventional BMs ineffective so that improving missile defenses would become more effective over time. And a lot of that time has passed.

More importantly, the qualitative and numerical improvement in US alliance navies is helping to keep pace with what the Chinese are doing to expand theirs, thus reducing pressure on the USN's growth imperatives. Even if the Chinese could manage to halve the number of USN carriers and LHDs via up to 4,000 km range BMs, both USAF and allied air forces aren't going away if they did that. The Chinese mainland would still get smashed.

Plus the 1,500 km (809nm) range of the DF-21 is already much shorter than the strike range of F-35C + MQ-25 + JASSM-ER.

And the necessarily smaller number of "4,000 km" range DF-26B BMs (2,159 nm strike radius) can already be matched in 2025 by F-35C + MQ-25 + JASSM-ER - which will have about the same strike radius.

If this USN force then evolves by 2030, into F-35D + MQ-25 + JASSM-XR, then USN's strike range will also exceed the best anti-carrier strike range of the DF-26B, as foreboded within that Kris Osborn article.

… over 1,500 kilometers in the case of the DF-21D and 4,000 kilometers in the case of the DF-26B …


There is nothing the PLA can currently or prospectively do which will ultimately spare central China from getting clobbered by heavy conventional missile attacks from USN carriers, plus USAF, plus allied and emergent coalition air forces. China remains at a terrible disadvantage and is likely to remain fully exposed to USN VLO missile attacks, plus forward-based long range USMC cruise missile and BM strikes, plus a preponderance of USAF missile attacks as well, from within the near region.

PLA would get absolutely smashed if they tried to sink USN carriers or LHDs with BMs.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2020, 09:11
by jessmo112
The army fielding long and medium range strike weapons is a game changer.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3 ... -6-missile

If we really could build an artillery with one thosand miles range, and ground launched cruise missiles in quantity. This will change things. I dont know how fast an artillery shell can travel, but it might counter fire before a Chinese missile launcher can pack up and leave.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2020, 10:54
by zhangmdev
The entire mobile launcher thing is just a bait to attract fire power. If the real war breaks out, there are far more important and easier targets than those glorified trailers.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 15 Sep 2020, 20:35
by jessmo112
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/massive-br ... se-missile

Check out this development.
Is this the end of massed cruise missile strikes?
Imagine if the could tweak this to target ballastic missiles. It would make for a clever and abundant point defense.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 15 Sep 2020, 21:02
by milosh
jessmo112 wrote:https://www.foxnews.com/tech/massive-breakthrough-155-mm-howitzer-artillery-destroys-attacking-cruise-missile

Check out this development.
Is this the end of massed cruise missile strikes?
Imagine if the could tweak this to target ballastic missiles. It would make for a clever and abundant point defense.


Railguns were seen as ABM solution but technological problems and hypersonic gliders made them much less useful at least for ABM defense.