Page 3 of 3

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 01 Sep 2020, 03:18
by element1loop
jessmo112 wrote:https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.foxnews.com/tech/how-would-the-us-navy-stop-chinese-carrier-killer-anti-ship-missiles.amp


This popped up last week. USAF development for maneuvering 'gliding' BMs occurred during the mid-1960s, and was well developed by the late 1970s. Everyone's played catch-up since. But they pretend it's new and that Russia did it first.

PDF Report from Aerospace Corp (Aug 26, 2020) The Missile Threat: A Taxonomy for Moving Beyond Ballistic

https://aerospace.org/sites/default/fil ... 0826_0.pdf

Summary

“U.S. approaches to missile warning and missile defense remain predicated on the idea that most adversarial missiles will follow parabolic ballistic trajectories to predictable targets. That no longer adequately describes the threat. Based on a survey of missile systems from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, most potential adversarial missiles have maneuvering capabilities that distinguish them from ballistic missiles. Yet, because more appropriate constructs for classifying missiles do not exist, U.S. guidance mischaracterizes many of these systems as ballistic. If we mislabel missiles because we are using outdated heuristics, we may find ourselves surprised and ill-equipped to confront current and anticipated threats. Our current constructs tend to treat maneuverability as a binary—e.g., hypersonic glide vehicles are maneuverable and ballistic missiles are not. But, in fact, there is a spectrum of maneuverability, which creates the need for more nuanced distinctions. A more comprehensive taxonomy for capturing the threat, as presented in this paper, could affect decisions for missile warning, missile defense, and broader strategic policy.


The current USN multilayered defense was designed to respond to maneuvering tactical conventional BMs. And the new rash of concern is an evolution of a long preexisting threat and nothing fundamentally new. 'Hypersonic gliders' are not a new threat, I read about these many times in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They're perhaps new within opposing force conventional RVs now though. USN DDG quality and numbers, plus their sensors, SAM quality (and numbers) are all at a new level compared to when maneuvering RVs became a viable weapon during the cold war. Only now these have become a conventional attack threat for ships as well. I would say that from the beginning denying targeting data has been the best way to make precision conventional BMs ineffective so that improving missile defenses would become more effective over time. And a lot of that time has passed.

More importantly, the qualitative and numerical improvement in US alliance navies is helping to keep pace with what the Chinese are doing to expand theirs, thus reducing pressure on the USN's growth imperatives. Even if the Chinese could manage to halve the number of USN carriers and LHDs via up to 4,000 km range BMs, both USAF and allied air forces aren't going away if they did that. The Chinese mainland would still get smashed.

Plus the 1,500 km (809nm) range of the DF-21 is already much shorter than the strike range of F-35C + MQ-25 + JASSM-ER.

And the necessarily smaller number of "4,000 km" range DF-26B BMs (2,159 nm strike radius) can already be matched in 2025 by F-35C + MQ-25 + JASSM-ER - which will have about the same strike radius.

If this USN force then evolves by 2030, into F-35D + MQ-25 + JASSM-XR, then USN's strike range will also exceed the best anti-carrier strike range of the DF-26B, as foreboded within that Kris Osborn article.

… over 1,500 kilometers in the case of the DF-21D and 4,000 kilometers in the case of the DF-26B …


There is nothing the PLA can currently or prospectively do which will ultimately spare central China from getting clobbered by heavy conventional missile attacks from USN carriers, plus USAF, plus allied and emergent coalition air forces. China remains at a terrible disadvantage and is likely to remain fully exposed to USN VLO missile attacks, plus forward-based long range USMC cruise missile and BM strikes, plus a preponderance of USAF missile attacks as well, from within the near region.

PLA would get absolutely smashed if they tried to sink USN carriers or LHDs with BMs.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2020, 09:11
by jessmo112
The army fielding long and medium range strike weapons is a game changer.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3 ... -6-missile

If we really could build an artillery with one thosand miles range, and ground launched cruise missiles in quantity. This will change things. I dont know how fast an artillery shell can travel, but it might counter fire before a Chinese missile launcher can pack up and leave.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 07 Sep 2020, 10:54
by zhangmdev
The entire mobile launcher thing is just a bait to attract fire power. If the real war breaks out, there are far more important and easier targets than those glorified trailers.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 15 Sep 2020, 20:35
by jessmo112
https://www.foxnews.com/tech/massive-br ... se-missile

Check out this development.
Is this the end of massed cruise missile strikes?
Imagine if the could tweak this to target ballastic missiles. It would make for a clever and abundant point defense.

Re: How will a theoretical Chinese carrier killer work?

Unread postPosted: 15 Sep 2020, 21:02
by milosh
jessmo112 wrote:https://www.foxnews.com/tech/massive-breakthrough-155-mm-howitzer-artillery-destroys-attacking-cruise-missile

Check out this development.
Is this the end of massed cruise missile strikes?
Imagine if the could tweak this to target ballastic missiles. It would make for a clever and abundant point defense.


Railguns were seen as ABM solution but technological problems and hypersonic gliders made them much less useful at least for ABM defense.