Surface to Air missile systems

[element1loop]

Well from what we know, the Aegis system is designed to engage
-Satellites
-Ballistic missiles
-Aircraft
-Cruise missiles
-Surface vessels

SM2 has a rapid-reaction capability to hit time-critical targets ashore.

[hornetfinn]

No the Aegis network is mostly built into the legacy Burke class destroyers which make up the most of the US fleet defense operation. Burke has a low to its hull, fairly old radar that struggles with skimming missiles with detection only in hundreds of meters.

No, not even close. These are integrated systems-of-systems not some old stove-piped cold-war era Soviet cruiser.

Very true. And I'd like to know where that "info" about detecing sea skimming missiles only in hundreds of meters comes from. First, the minimum range of SPY-1 is likely longer than that, so they would never detect those missile if that was true. But USN has tested Aegis and SPY-1 systems extensively and very successfully against all kinds of threat missiles, including sea skimmers.

[shania]

Any supersonic missile (let alone hypersonic) will likely be able to overpower a Burke Destroyer net with just a few missiles. What makes it worse is that the US navy is only just been giving its Burke's active missiles like the ESSM, most of the standard designs are legacy missiles that are illumination based for termination and require baby sitting, of which only two-3 (3 on Tichondria cruisers) for each termination meaning a low number of controlled missiles.

A zircon would likely be able to fly through a US carrier strike group and destroy any projected target with ease. The only defence the US have would be to use an aircraft like the F-35 to control high end missiles like SM-6 (costly/heavy/small in number) to try and hit the Zircon through mass salvo from multiple Burkes.

Even old SM-2 was designed do deal with swarms of supersonic ASM...
Tico have 4 and Burke 3 AN/SPG-62 Illuminators

What that mean each AN/SPG-62 Illuminator can guide one or more missile from entire AEGIS formation, if its have LOS to target.
OK thats look like problem against sea skimming missiles, where probably only one ship will have LOS on them at meaningful distances (Radar horizon for radar at only 10m to missile flying at 6m is still over 20km... ), but SM-2 or ESSM fly on mid course updates and needs illumination only at terminal phase. So AEGIS system can guide lots of missiles on lots of targets. Single ship can at last manage 10-20 ASM, they will probably run out of missiles due to current low missile loadouts.

Paper speed on hyper sonic/supersonic ASM are from high altitudes, when they fly low, they fly much slower... and range is limited... there is no hyper-sonic ASM with sea skimming capability...

So zircon is not sea skimming ant when this missile goes down to target, it will slow down.
Next thing, radar guided ASM can hit anything against soft kill countermeasures.

ESSM and SM-2 have ARH variants with AIM-120 guidance section (SM-6, ESSM blk 2)...

[madrat]

Why do you guys debate this numbnuts. It is pretty obvious it's the same troll as always, simply under a new nick.

[weasel1962]

No the Aegis network is mostly built into the legacy Burke class destroyers which make up the most of the US fleet defense operation. Burke has a low to its hull, fairly old radar that struggles with skimming missiles with detection only in hundreds of meters.

No, not even close. These are integrated systems-of-systems not some old stove-piped cold-war era Soviet cruiser.

Very true. And I'd like to know where that "info" about detecing sea skimming missiles only in hundreds of meters comes from. First, the minimum range of SPY-1 is likely longer than that, so they would never detect those missile if that was true. But USN has tested Aegis and SPY-1 systems extensively and very successfully against all kinds of threat missiles, including sea skimmers.

Sea/ground level radars suffer from horizon detection limitations. Horizon detection of a sea skimmer flying at 6 ft is 50 00m which goes up to 150 00-400 00m if the detection radar is at 10m to if the skimmer flies at 150ft.

The above is pretty much irrelevant once an AWACs is in the air (detection of any low flying target goes up to 4000 00m).

[hornetfinn]

... I think against modern fighters (and cruise missiles) smaller, lower cost/more numerous, geographically widely separated and more unpredictable systems are more dangerous. Systems like Snyder, IRIS-T SLM/SLS or NASAMS can be pretty nasty as they are all pretty capable systems with quick reaction times and more difficult to find and destroy. Of course they don't have similar range/altitude capability as larger systems. So they are kind of mine field type of systems which require enemy to come pretty close to be effective.

I doubt this approach will work out so well tactically or practically HF, nor be quite so dangerous to an attacking air force.

(1) Such distributed systems are not cheap to field and unlikely to be acquired in high enough numbers by most countries to operate them effectively in that way.

(2) The most useful and immediate role for them would be as an outer point-defense layer to preserve high-value targets from massed strikes early in a conflict (else you've already lost). This would be the most pressing as well effective way to employ them, for a considerable period into the conflict and to better preserve the overall armed force's capabilities.

(3) Translating into not too many such systems being available to create much of a SAM 'mine-field', of random and mobile pop-ups. Such a SAM menace is going to be more effective against helicopters and low to mid-altitude drones (rather than fast jets at Mach 0.9 @ FL400 or higher with copious standoff weapons. The fast-jet approach path and standoff weapon use is virtually unconstrained by geography (no or little need to radar-mask at low altitudes).

4) Logistical support for these distributed SAMs is going to immediately come under stress as well as attacked early and often at the source. So systems deployed closer in to a high-value target will be far easier to support.

5) Such SAMs are likely to be effective only against a 4th-gen air force which can't easily break the kill chain.

6) Rising missile point-of-origins, from DAS and any "YATO" indication will much more easy deal with than previous, and also to discover and target launchers fast, which can be almost immediately attacked by a 5th-gen ubiquitous HOBS-LOAL multi-role fire-and-forget missiles with automated D/L support and autonomous-homing and classifying glide-weapons.


So distributed hunters quickly become the hunted and the aerial 'minefield' will be cleared away.

Combine that with SAR surveillance and EOTS ID target prioritizing and a SAM system shooting 'n scooting shouldn't last long. Thus a mutually supporting point-defense layers may be the best use of low to mid-range SAM systems (especially if they're supported by F-35 data within an allied context).

Actually such distributed systems are pretty cheap compared to S-400 and Patriot. For one Patriot/S-400 battery you can buy 3-4 NASAMS/Spyder etc. batteries. Many smaller countries have opted for these instead of heavier and more expensive systems. Of course the best course would be to combine both kinds of systems.

These systems can have pretty impressive range/altitude capability. Like Spyder here:
https://www.rafael.co.il/wp-content/upl ... -Eng-1.pdf

They can reach 60-80 km in range and 15-20 km in altitude using I-Derby with booster assemblies. With regular I-Derby it can reach 40 km in range and 12 km in altitude. Of course these are best case scenarios and real world capabilities are lower in most situations. But they can definitely be a significant threat even to fighter jets flying at higher altitudes.

Of course 5th gen jets are pretty safe even against these systems, but these are still much more unpredictable opponents than large systems like S-400 or Patriot as those are still more fixed systems and require much more effort to move around. These larger systems are also tend to use much closer emplacement for the systems parts. These smaller systems are about as mobile as you can get and killing launchers is not easy task.

I agree that thinking about co-operation and mutual support for these SAM systems and fighter jets is very important. Especially when it comes to 5th gen jets and their sensors and networking capability.

[element1loop]

... So they are kind of mine field type of systems which require enemy to come pretty close to be effective.

Thus a mutually supporting point-defense layers may be the best use of low to mid-range SAM systems (especially if they're supported by F-35 data within an allied context).

I agree that thinking about co-operation and mutual support for these SAM systems and fighter jets is very important. Especially when it comes to 5th gen jets and their sensors and networking capability.

I'm hoping this will turn out very well in tests with NASAMS and F-35A, it means a successful surprise strike from subs become a lot less likely to work as planned, if you have orbiting F-35As up. Thus especially effective if you have the EW and intel to support an IADS with an alert to get a couple of F-35 into the air first.

In that arrangement I'm less concerned with needing Patriot against tactical platforms and weapons, as F-35A should be able to take care of those threats if there are enough F-35s in the right place, to cover high-value targets, along with enough strategic-depth and EW time plus range. This could become a very effective cheap point-defence solution against surprise attack within the right geography.

NASAMS and F-35A would also make a great mobile combination for taking and holding airspace. With ESSMII and AIM-260 to upgrade, that's going to be a very dangerous SAM system when moved forwards by chooks or trucks. That's the benefit of having a network of VLO micro E-7A. I can see where the Israelis are going with the Spyder plus F-35I combo, as that does make a lot of sense - nasty.