Russian A2/AD Bubble not as inpenetrable as thought

[mixelflick]

The point about Turkey already having access to US/F-35 tech and sharing it with the Russians to make the S-400 an F-35 killer...

OK, maybe. But if someone at LM didn't see that coming and took steps to prevent that from happening - shame on them. It was known far and wide this aircraft would be exported, and everything from the Turkey situation to a defection should have been taken into consideration.

Frankly, I'd be shocked if either of those scenarios (and more) haven't been taken into account. There must be some way of protecting the F-35's secret sauce. US air superiority and indeed entire future air campaigns hinge on it.

[sferrin]

The point about Turkey already having access to US/F-35 tech and sharing it with the Russians to make the S-400 an F-35 killer...

OK, maybe. But if someone at LM didn't see that coming and took steps to prevent that from happening - shame on them.

Can you say, "data breach"? I knew you could. When it comes to security and the F-35 the safest bet is to assume it's run by the Keystone Cops. That's about the only way one could account for the rampant theft of F-35 data.

[tomcooper]

I agree. Integration of such systems is very possible and has been done in Finland for example. We had 9K37M1 Buk-M1 (SA-11) and F/A-18 Hornets used at the same time (about 2 decades) and integrating the two was not much of a problem. It's just a matter of making some suitable hardware and software.

Actually, it's much more complex.

Alone the modern-day Russian-made hardware and software isn't compatible with 20+ years old Soviet/Russian stuff any more (indeed: not even with ATMS' made to make multiple diverse systems compatible with each other!). Especially not when it comes to IFF. And the Russians aren't the least stupid to share their crypto with anybody at all (even less so with a country that's still a NATO-member).

But integrating is still not that difficult, although it's also not a small task either especially with such powerful systems.

It's not the least 'easy', that much is sure.

Sufficient to say: yes, Turkey might be an exception, but until today the majority of customers for Russian arms do not even have the capability to write/program their own IFF-codes. And that's just the start of the story. Even once the necessary software is written and proven to function, it still requires compatibility with all the elements of the system (i.e. all the software on diverse radars, SAM-systems, aircraft etc.). And that is an entirely different pair of shoes than enabling simultaneous operation of F/A-18Cs and SA-11s within the same piece of airspace.

...so much so, 'that' issue with the IFF was the principal reasons why the Assadists blasted that Russian Il-20M all the way to Mars, last autumn..

[milosh]

Lots of talks about producing more iskander, zircon, kinzhal missiles which can be used to attack air defenses and even air bases.

Iskander is just a theatre ballistic missile.
Kinzhal is just an Iskander with more range.

Both still have to re-enter the thicker parts of the atmosphere where they will ALWAYS slow down to <Mach 2.0 as they approach a ground target. Those can be shot down with existing SAMs right now, so that's no real solution. Hence 'new-baloney' about the super-duper 'Zircon', that's TASS/RT/Sputnik vaporware. Brace to be ZirCON spammed for the next 12 months or so.

I am not sure but I think Pershing-2 and Oka had much higher terminal speeds. And speed isn't everything modern SAM can engage very fast warheads what is more important is maneuvering. Iskander is similar size as Oka but have smaller range and speed because it doesn't have ideal ballistic path because it change its path during boost phase and some sources mentioned warhead is marv so warhead is heavier then Oka warhead.

Kinzal is air launched Iskander and as it look like it will not be for long operational it is stop gap until Zircon is ready, while Zircon is slower, Tu-22 could carry more Zircons and have decent range. Carrying four Kinzal will impacted Tu-22 range a lot it would be worse then with three Kh-22/32 which Tu-22 almost never carry (it carry only two).

Also there is possibility Tu-22 will carry shorter (small buster) Zircon in weapon bay so after launch external carried ones it could speed up and then launch six shorter owns. Something like that is impossible with Kindzal because it is classic balistic missile not ramjet/scramjet missile.

@all

Buying S-400 is logical. Turks doesn't need S-400 for AA role but for ABM role. Only country with which they have problems is Israel and Israel have medium range ballistic missiles agianst which Turkey doesn't have answer. Buying PAC-3 would be stupid, Israel we can say own US so Turks would find hard way they spent billions on system which Israel can turn with pressure of button. That is why Turkey wanted to be allow to check and modify PAC-3 and when US said no they decide to buy Chinese HQ-9 because they weren't good with Russia back then. But NATO (read USA) put pressure and Turkey canceled HQ-9, then potential CIA coupe failed (some say thanks to KGB info) and of course Erdo will buy S-400 after that.

[hornetfinn]

I agree. Integration of such systems is very possible and has been done in Finland for example. We had 9K37M1 Buk-M1 (SA-11) and F/A-18 Hornets used at the same time (about 2 decades) and integrating the two was not much of a problem. It's just a matter of making some suitable hardware and software.

Actually, it's much more complex.

Alone the modern-day Russian-made hardware and software isn't compatible with 20+ years old Soviet/Russian stuff any more (indeed: not even with ATMS' made to make multiple diverse systems compatible with each other!). Especially not when it comes to IFF. And the Russians aren't the least stupid to share their crypto with anybody at all (even less so with a country that's still a NATO-member).

But integrating is still not that difficult, although it's also not a small task either especially with such powerful systems.

It's not the least 'easy', that much is sure.

Sufficient to say: yes, Turkey might be an exception, but until today the majority of customers for Russian arms do not even have the capability to write/program their own IFF-codes. And that's just the start of the story. Even once the necessary software is written and proven to function, it still requires compatibility with all the elements of the system (i.e. all the software on diverse radars, SAM-systems, aircraft etc.). And that is an entirely different pair of shoes than enabling simultaneous operation of F/A-18Cs and SA-11s within the same piece of airspace.

...so much so, 'that' issue with the IFF was the principal reasons why the Assadists blasted that Russian Il-20M all the way to Mars, last autumn..

I agree that good integration would require co-operation between Turkey and Russia. It would basically require NATO compatible IFF system (Aselsan makes those) and integrating it with S-400 system. This would need protocol conversion software and possibly hardware also depending on what kind of interfaces there are in S-400 systems. Russian systems would not work as they are incompatible with NATO IFF systems. Same with getting track and plot data from S-400 systems to Turkish air defence network and vice versa. It requires similar protocol conversion and filtering of data.

Another major thing is also making S-400 compatible with Link 16. This would be pretty important for having full performance capabilties. This would be the most difficult thing to do both technologically and from security PoV.

So technologically it can done, but I agree that it would not be easy (especially when it comes to security) nor cheap. This is why it seems that Turkey will use the S-400 as a standalone system with only Turkish NATO compatible IFF system installed. Not a perfect solution and it seems like their S-400 will be pretty much for ABM duties only.

[gc]

B-52H conducted simulated attacks on Kalinagrad. Russia confirms and claims its radar forced it to turn around. Seems like the truth is that the Stratofortress got close enough to release its payload of baseline A model JASSMs.

https://defence-blog.com/news/us-bomber ... -base.html

https://defence-blog.com/news/russian-d ... ngrad.html

[madrat]

If Erdogan is bound to the deal then it's some agreement that he doesn't want to break for strategic reasons.

That alone should be reason to drop Turkey from NATO strategic planning information. They are turncoats.

[marsavian]

Buying S-400 is logical. Turks doesn't need S-400 for AA role but for ABM role. Only country with which they have problems is Israel and Israel have medium range ballistic missiles agianst which Turkey doesn't have answer. Buying PAC-3 would be stupid, Israel we can say own US so Turks would find hard way they spent billions on system which Israel can turn with pressure of button. That is why Turkey wanted to be allow to check and modify PAC-3 and when US said no they decide to buy Chinese HQ-9 because they weren't good with Russia back then. But NATO (read USA) put pressure and Turkey canceled HQ-9, then potential CIA coupe failed (some say thanks to KGB info) and of course Erdo will buy S-400 after that.

Fair enough, sounds logical. So if the Turks have a serious geopolitical problem with Israel another reason not to give them F-35s. Perhaps Greece should pick up some F-35 further down the line too as there are continual territorial disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Islands going back to the last century. Erdogan has no filter, he's just a loud boorish undiplomatic Muslim Nationalist leader drunk on his power pretty much like the Iranian Ayotollahs. This divorce from the West has been long in coming especially as he has previously been busy violently arguing with the EU over so many matters and the Austrians are now openly calling for EU Accession talks for Turkey to be halted permanently.

[milosh]

One more reason to get S-400 is tech transfer. Turks plan to make their own SAM so they are probable going for same deal as Koreans, Korean new SAM is developed in cooperation with russian Almaz, it have missile similar to small S-400 missile and Korean AESA radar. Turks would need more help because they are not just weak in missile r&d but also in radar r&d.

[weasel1962]

Everything points towards a larger military required. CSBA on NATO's eastern front.

https://csbaonline.org/research/publica ... n-frontier

[element1loop]

A more lengthy and technically detailed FOI analysis volume, regarding Russian A2/D2 within the European/Baltic context, released this week.

Beyond Bursting Bubbles - Understanding the Full Spectrum of the Russian A2AD Threat and Identifying Strategies for Counteraction - June 3rd 2020

Full PDF report link (214 PDF pages) from FOI website:
https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4991--SE

Abstract
States with the ability to use a combination of sensors and long-range missiles to prevent adversaries from operating and thus creating an exclusion zone, are said to possess anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This collection of essays uses our previous FOI report on Russian A2/AD capabilities (Bursting the Bubble) as a point of departure. Ten experts analyse five themes: Russian A2/AD capabilities today and in the future; options for counter-A2/AD operations in Europe; concepts for defending or reconquering territory under a hostile A2/AD umbrella; different approaches to managing the long-range precision strike threat; and the impact of A2/AD on the balance of power in Europe. The study does not arrive at any single, overarching conclusion, but there is significant convergence of views amongst a majority of the authors. On the one hand, Russia cannot create impenetrable "bubbles" where NATO forces cannot operate. On the other hand, counter-A2/AD operations are complex, requiring significant assets and capabilities, and carry significant risk of high attrition rates. The critical factors are the assets required, expected attrition rates, the time frames needed - and political will to shoulder costs and risks. A majority of the authors also argue that Russian A2/AD would be at its most troublesome during a short, sharp war, making well-rehearsed countermeasures essential. Compared to Bursting the Bubble, the multi-domain character of counter-A2/AD operations, including i.a. electronic warfare and non-military means, is emphasised, thus deepening the granularity of the analyses. Considerable uncertainty or disagreement remains on topics such as the level of integration within Russian air defences, the impact of stealth, and electronic warfare.

Introduction

On March 4, 2019, FOI published the report, Bursting the Bubble – Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications.1 Initiated almost two years earlier, the study had originally been intended as a brief open-sourced primer for non-specialists, explaining why security analysts should not accept inflated claims regarding Russia’s ability to create impenetrable antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) “bubbles” – often represented on maps by large red circles – using long-range sensors and missiles. As work progressed, however, we found it increasingly necessary to drive home why this was the case, so the study continuously expanded in volume, especially towards explaining the technical limitations of the main systems, the wide array of possible countermeasures available, and the strategic considerations, which together limit Russia’s ability to impose large “no-go zones.” Conversely, Russia has strong incentives – political as well as economic – for creating exactly this impression, which is why claims about the maximal capabilities of its main systems (such as the long-range airdefence system S-400) should be taken with a healthy dose of scepticism, rather than simply accepted at face-value.2

While neither of us are rocket scientists, electronics engineers, nor Russian area specialists, our work benefited greatly from the fact that FOI has in-house topnotch specialists in these fields who could aid and augment our analysis. Moreover, parallel studies – relying on complementary sources – of Russia’s A2/AD capabilities further reinforced several of the findings from our open-source analysis.

Published at an opportune time, Bursting the Bubble quickly garnered an inordinate amount of attention, at least by the standards of an FOI publication. The report became by far the most widely downloaded FOI publication in 2019; it was cited and debated in numerous specialist and non-specialist publications and attracted attention from practitioners and policymakers alike.3 Perhaps most encouragingly, the report seemed to break the spell surrounding Russian A2/AD capabilities, as even the harshest critics of the study accepted its basic arguments: that Russia cannot create impenetrable bubbles; that the maximum nominal range of its systems should not be confused with their substantially shorter effective range; and that much of the public debate on the topic had up to that point been simplistic to a fault.

That being said, in spite of the wide scope of Bursting the Bubble, we were always cognisant that it was by no means the last word on Russian A2/AD capabilities.4 Firstly, the study primarily analysed the main Russian systems (the aforementioned S-400, the sea-target missile Bastion P, and the Iskander-M ballistic missile) in depth. While the report certainly mentioned and considered a number of capabilities – the wide array of complementary shorter-range land-based systems, the long-range cruise missiles, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), and the support functions – the additional capability they provide and the complex “system versus system” aspect of a counter-A2/AD campaign was not explored in full depth.5 Secondly, additional factors that go beyond the three traditional domains of warfare, again, although mentioned and considered, were not explored in full detail. These factors include the non-military means of A2/AD, cyber, and electronic warfare (EW), as well as Russian doctrine and historical experiences from the suppression of other enemy air defence (SEAD) campaigns than those mentioned in the study. This omission was not an oversight, but simply reflected a decision to eat the elephant one bite at a time. Already as it was, the project stretched time, energy, and financial resources to the limit. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we were aware of the risk of being misinterpreted, moving the public debate in apendulum swing from one of exaggerated fears towards one of equally unwarranted dismissiveness. Dismissing Russia’s A2/AD capabilities was never the objective nor the argument of the study, a qualification clearly and repeatedly emphasised,6 but some nonetheless managed to read such conclusions into its findings.7

Purpose and Organization of the Report

Continuing the analysis where Bursting the Bubble left off is the aim of this edited volume. Published as a report, it represents the proceedings of a conference organised by FOI and held in Stockholm, December 5–6, 2019. The purpose of the meeting was threefold: firstly, to expose our study and its findings to critical scrutiny from a wide spectrum of experts; secondly, to identify areas of common ground amongst leading researchers and practitioners; and, thirdly, to map out the areas of remaining disagreement or uncertainty for future research. The workshop was organised into five panels, covering topics that we had already deemed as needing further analysis, with two panellists to discuss each topic:

• Status and Future of Russian A2/AD Systems and Capabilities. Justin Bronk (RUSI) and Douglas Barrie (IISS).

• Options for Counter-A2/AD SEAD in Europe: Tactics, Techniques, and Necessary Assets. Jamie Meighan (RAF, Maxwell AFB); Karl Mueller (RAND).

• Concepts for Defending or Reconquering Territory under a Hostile A2/AD Umbrella. Anders Puck Nielsen (Danish Defence College); Ilmars Lejins (Latvian Army).

• Different Approaches to Managing the Long-Range Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. Robin Häggblom (FI); Luis Simon (Vrije Universiteit Brussel).

• Impact of A2/AD on the Emerging Balance of Power in Northern Europe? Ben Hodges (CEPA); Keir Giles (Chatham House).

The conference was attended by invitation only and held under the Chatham House Rule. As such, the chapters in these proceedings are based on papers that the speakers submitted ahead of the conference and finalised afterwards, rather than on primarily or directly what was said during the conference itself.

The earlier PDF volume is here:

Bursting the Bubble - March, 2019

Full PDF report link (114 PDF pages) from FOI website:
https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4651--SE

[element1loop]

Russian S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile System: Is It Worth the Sticker Price?

by Peter A. Wilson and John V. Parachini

May 6, 2020

In October 2018, the India Ministry of Defense concluded a $5.5 billion deal to buy four regiments of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Just over a year later, India made an advance payment of $850 million to expedite the deployment from Russia of the first regiment by September 2021. However, many countries do not fully appreciate that effective air defense requires a networked system and not just one missile system component. To get the true defensive value out of the S-400, there are additional components that add costs and complexities to the system.

To support U.S. government foreign assistance training for nations on how to comply with U.S. and U.N. sanctions, the RAND Corporation has examined open sources covering Russia arms sales around the world. One of the findings from the material contained in this database is that many countries with scarce national resources purchase weapons systems without fully appreciating the other equipment elements required to make the systems effective. Additionally, they do not adequately account for the full lifecycle costs of all the pieces of equipment needed; lifecycle costs typically exceed the original purchase costs in about seven years.

The Indian Armed Forces, like other national militaries seeking to boost their air defense capabilities, must sort through tremendous financial and technical challenges. India faces a diverse set of ballistic missile threats from its neighbors and no single system can solve this complex challenge. Even the S-400, a very high-performance high-altitude missile aerospace defense system (HIMADS), has important limitations.

At a basic level, the S-400's field of view for the search and fire control radar is limited to the horizon of the earth. Because of this common limitation, search radars are typically placed on tall masts to better see over the horizon. An even better solution is to position radars on specialized aircraft, airborne warning and control aircraft systems (AWACS), or on stationary tethered balloons known as “aerostats.” However, without over the horizon sensors, the S-400, and other powerful HIMADS system, are vulnerable to a low-altitude attack by cruise missiles, which, in large numbers, can overwhelm an air defense system.

To be effective against an array of missile threats, the S-400 regiments need to be tightly integrated with AWACS aircraft. Depending on the number of S-400's and the types of targets they are expected to defend, a military may need to expand the size of its AWACS fleet to provide nearly continuous coverage to the SAM sites. Yet, the cost of fuel and maintenance make it expensive to operate a sizable fleet of AWACS aircraft.

[More at link]

https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/05/russi ... worth.html

Expensive to cover AWACS with fighters, once those SAMS get hit. So the Russians or Chinese want AWACS flying about with hundreds of 5th-gens closing? What’s up with that? Russians need a suitable fighter in high enough numbers to fly a defendable AWACS in typical uses just to hold the airspace. If they can make S-400 effective too, fine. But that looks like a very limited tactical time-frame for availability of AWACS services. The cruise or glide weapon threat to heavy SAMs will be almost constant.


From this month …

Drone-Era Warfare Shows the Operational Limits of Air Defense Systems

by John V. Parachini and Peter A. Wilson

July 2, 2020

While most countries struggle with the COVID-19 pandemic, the civil wars in Syria and Libya have become battlegrounds for foreign states backing different local sides. External powers have intervened in both civil wars supplying advanced conventional weapons that have intensified the conflicts, but not all the weapons have performed as claimed. Perhaps the most startling example of this is how ineffective modern Russian air defense systems have been at countering drones and low-flying missiles. In the face-off between expensive air defensive systems and lower cost offensive drones and low-flying missiles, the offense is winning.

In recent weeks, drones supplied by Turkey (PDF) in support of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord have reportedly destroyed the Russian Pantsir short-range air defense systems (SHORADS) that the opposition Libyan National Army (LNA) used to protect their forces. The inability of the LNA to protect their forces has turned the tide of the conflict and is a reminder of how difficult effective air defense is in an era of comparatively inexpensive armed drones and precision guided low-flying cruise missiles.

[More at link]

https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07/drone ... f-air.html

Ru SAMs look outmoded against current attack tech, they struggle against 4th-gen using older technology, weapons and tactics. Without a comprehensive balanced but sizable 5th gen force at the core of the Russian legacy force I don’t see how the described structure can work for them in a real battle. Particularly to impose area-denial on an F-35-structured strikefighter force supporting 4th-gens with longer-range standoff and widespread support-jamming.

OTOH, Western forces look to be increasingly capable of imposing and extending area-denial against Russian or Chinese forces. They may get some BMs and cruise weapons through, but a lot of those won’t make it either. The main defense against the Western force is geographical distances, not their defensive tech, but longer-range cruise weapons, CFTs, new tankers, plus innate range increase of 5th gens is taking that away too. The larger Russian SAMS maybe make 5th gens fly more track-miles to get to a launch point, but only for as long as heavy SAM sensors function. Strong EA and tactics would put an end to that ‘area-denial’ effect also.

I am surprised how easily the Ru short-range systems fall over, it’s concerning, as I wonder if western short-range systems would similarly fail this easily? Losses may have been light but the way less sophisticated Iranian cruise weapons hit US bases (even with early-warning) suggests fielded point-defense systems were far from good enough and the non-kinetic options like EA were disappointing as a defensive capability, too. After all the time on the ground in the ME we should have produced comprehensively better point-defense systems against guided weapons by now.

Perhaps a large ground force can absorb a fair bit of that sort of attack, but a small highly integrated joint force needs all of the bits to survive to remain effective, so need a point-defense to work - almost perfectly. This I think is the real SAM problem for western forces now. We all need credible point-defenses, which can maintain joint initiative to eliminate an enemy force faster, with fewer losses and less degradation from harder to stop cruise weapons.

This would also serve to make A2D2 offensive weapons almost as ineffective as Ru defensive SAMS have become. Thus Russia, China, Iran, DPRK are just going to build and use more cruise weapons, until we make those affordably and credibly ineffective as well.

We seem to have more-or-less solved the SAM network defensive threat but have significantly neglected the offensive cruise missile threat. But are now thoroughly distracted by a much lower numbers hypersonic missile threat (much easier to see coming, if you can see it, you can hit it), but weirdly overlooked the biggest threat of all (to Russian and Chinese systems as well) to our own forces.

This threat somehow ended-up in the "to hard" file, we've developed a blind-spot to it for the past 2 decades (at least that's my perception, others may see it otherwise). We've presumed point-defenses will work in a multi-layered system. I don't see this as credible, I doubt military competitors do either.

This is the main reason why area-denial approaches still look formidable, our point-defenses against missiles have remained comparatively ineffective and lack credibility.

2c